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·COVEREDBYTHE GENERAL BUDGET-
SITUATION AT 31  DECEMBER 1993 REPORT ON GUARANTEES COVERED BY THE GENERAL BUDGET 
·SITUATION AT 31 DECEMBER 1993  . 
· This report describes the situation as regards budget guarantees at ll December 1993. 
It is in response to the statement made by the 'commission, when the vote was taken on 
supplementary and  amending  b~dget No 1191,  that  it  would  report  to  the  budgetary 
authority twice a year on budget guarantees and the corresp.onding risks. 
.  .  . 
The Commission has ci.lready presented five reports to the budgetary_ authority. 
The report is in thre.e parts: 
1. Description of  operations entered in the budget and events since the last report. 
2.  Situation  at  31  December 1993  as  regards risks for  the b11dget  in future  years  and 
guarantees already activated. 
3.  Assessment. of the  economic  and  financial  situation  of non~Comrimnity countries 
benefiting .from the most important operations. 
2 i  . 
PART ONE:  OPERATIONS ALREADY ENTERED IN THE BUDGET 
The' budgetary  authority  has  authorized 22 headings  with  token ·entries  in  the  1994 · 
budget to cover any payment of guarantees.  These headings can be divided into three 
categories:  borrowing  and  lending  within  the  Community,  borrowing  and  lending 
outside the Community and ··guarantees given to financial institutions. 
I.  BORROWINGS TO BE ON-LENT WITHIN THE COMMUNITY 
A.  COMMUNITY BORROWING OPERATIONS TO PROVIDE 
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT 
The Community is authorized to borrow on the capital markets or from  financial 
institutions  and  make  the  sums  raised· available  to  Member States  experiencing 
temporary balance-of-payments difficulties. 
The outstanding amount of loans granted to Member States for this purpose may 
not exceed ECU 14 billion in principal. 
At 31 December 1993 .there  we~e two operations in  respect of Greece under the 
decisions of 9 December 1985 and 4 March 1991  and one operation in· respect of 
Italy under the decision of 18 January 1993. 
At 31  December 1993 the amount outstanding was ECU 1 200 million in loans to 
Greece and ECU 3 989.8 mi,llion in loans to Italy (Table 1). 
B. .  EURATOM BORROWING OPERATIONS 
In  1  977  the  Commission  was  empowered  to  borrow  funds  to  be  used  to  help · 
finance nuclear power stations. 
Loans are made to electricity producers and carry the usual guarantee demanded 
by  banks.  E.ecipients are often State-owned companies or companies enjoying a 
State guarantee. 
The  maximum  amount  of  borrowings  authorized  is. ECU 4 billion,· of which 
ECU 500 million  was  authorized  by  the  1977  decision,  ECU 500 million  in 
1980,  ECU 1 billion in  1982, ECU 1 billion in  1985  and ECU 1 billion in 1990. 
The  amount  borrowed  comes  to  around  ECU 2 900 million,  leaving 
ECU 1  ~00 million which may still· be raised. 
At 31  December 1993 the total outstanding was ECU 1 018.2 million. 
3 On 9 December 1992 the Commission proposed that the balance-of borrowings not 
used in the Member States could be -used to finance the improvement of the 'degree 
. of efficiency  and  safety' of nuclear power stations in  the  countries of Central 'and 
Eastern Europe and in the CIS. 
C.  BORROWING OPERATIONS FOR THE PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT IN 
THE COMMUNITY  . 
.  .  .  ··.  '  .  . 
. The  Commission  was empowered  by  a· Council  Decision  of 16 October 1978  to 
· borrow  funds  to  be  used  to· promote  investment  .m  lhe  ·community  (New 
Cpmmunity Instrument). 
The authorized  borrowing  ceiling  was  fixed  at- E.CU 1 billion  by  the  Decision  of·. 
16 October 1978  and  was  then  raised . by  ECU 1 billion. by  the  Decision  of 
l5 March 1982.  The ceiling was further raised by ECU 3 billion by the Decision of 
19 April l983 and by ECU 750 million by the Decision of9 March 1987. 
The proceeds of  the operations are paid out in the form of  loans granted by the EIB, 
acting  for  the· Commission,  to  finance  investment  projects ·which  contribute  to 
greater convergence and  growing integration and  are  consistent with the  priority 
Community ·objectives  in  the -energy,  industry  and  infrastructure  seCtors,· taking 
·account  of such  factqrs  as  the  regional  impact  of the  projects  and  the  need  to 
combat. unemployment.  Support  for-· small  businesses  was  also · made . a  priority 
objective by the Decision of  26 April 1982. 
A Decision of  20 January 1981  also empowered the Community to contract loans in 
order to provide exceptional aid of  E_CU 1 billion to the regions of Italy affected by 
the earthquake of'November 1980.  A similar  ~ecision involving  ECU.80 million 
was adopted .on  14 December 1981  for  th~ regions affected by  the earthquakes in 
Greece in February  /March 1981. 
.  . 
The maximum amount ofborrowmgs authorized thus comes to ECU 6 830 million. 
At  3.1  December .1 993  the  total  outstanding  was  ECU 2 202 million,  j3.  7~'0 less 
than on 31  December 1992. 
The risk is spread over a large number of  borrowers.  In addition, most of  the loans 
are global loans to financial institutions which guarantee repaym~nt of  the funds:  . 
Every year the EIB provides the Commission with a list of debtors who,  according 
to its information, risk defaulting in the coming year.  So far,  no mimes  have been 
recorded on this list. 
. II.  LOANS  RAISED·  FOR.  ON-LENDING  ·  TO.  NON-COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES· 
'4 A  PROGRAMME  OF BORRbWINGS CONTRACTED BY THE COMMUNITY 
. TO PROVIDE MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO HUNGARY 
(Hungary I) 
The Community is granting Hungary a medium-term loail. of  up to ECU 870 million 
in ·principal for a  maximum of five  years.  The loan is intended. to facilitate  the 
adjustment ofthe Hungarian economy in a way which will enable it to derive all the 
. be·nefits of  a market-based economy.  It is being made available in tranches. 
The first tranche ofECU 350 million was paid on 20 April1990.  A second tranche 
ofECU 260 million was .Paid on 14 February 1991.  The third tranche, which is not 
to  exceed  ECU 260 nullion,  was  ·planned  for  199.2  but  was  not  paid  out  as 
Hungary's  balance ·of payments  has been  more  favourable  than  expected.  The 
tranches will  be repai9 in  one instalment after five  years and  interest, which is  at 
variable rates, is payable ·half-yearly. 
B.  ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  HUNGARY 
{Hut!gary H) 
As the break-up ofthe Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and the 
· Gulf  ·crisis threatened to compromise the initial encouraging results of  the reforms 
und~rtaken,  it  was  decided  to  launch  a .  supplementary  borrowing  and  lending 
·operation  for  ECU 180 million  under  :an  overall  ECU 360 -million  G-24.  aid. 
programme. 
· The first tranche of  ECU 100 million was paid on 14 August 1991.  It will be repaid 
:in one instalment after seven years, and interest, which is at variable rates, is payable 
half-yearly.  The  second  tranche  of  ECU 80 million  was  due  paid  on 
15 January 1993.  It will be repaid in January 1997 and Interest,' which is at a fixed 
rate, is payable annually. 
C.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  PROVIDE 
MEDIUM~TERM  FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  FOR  THE  CZECH  AND 
SLOVAK ·FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
As part  -of,G-24~s total :aid of around ECU 750 million, the Commission, on behalf 
of  the Community, was empowered to borrow, in two tranches, ECU 375 million 
for a period of seven years.  The proceeds of  this operation were to be on-lent ·on 
·the same terms to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 
The first tranche of  ECU 185 million was paid on 14 August 1991 .  It  ~II be repaid 
in one ;instalment after seven years, and interest~ which is at variable rates, is payable 
half-yearly.· 
5 The  second ·tranche _pf ECU 190 million 'was  paid  on 2 March 1992  aQd  will  be 
repaid in one in~talment after six years. 
Fo11owing  the division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic  on  1 January 1993,  the Cominission. proposed that the  loan  be  divided 
between the two Republics. 
Two thirds  <:>f the loan - ECU 250 million.- would be for. the Czech ·Republic_ and 
one third- ECU 125 million- for the Slovak Repuqlic. 
D.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
BULGARIA MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
· As part of G...:.24's total aid of.ECU 580 million,  the Commission, on beha!f of the  · 
Community,  was empowered to borrow,  in  two tranches,  ECU 290 million  for. a 
period of seven years.  The proceeds of this operation were to be on-lent  on the 
same terms to Bulgaria. 
The first tranche of ECU 150 million  was paid to Bulgaria on 14 August 1991.  It 
will be repaid in one instalment after seven years, and interest, which is at variable 
.  -rates, is payable half~yearly,  ·  ·' 
The  second  tranche  of ECU 140 million  was  paid  on 2 March 1992 and  will  be 
repaid  in one  instalment after five  years.  Interest,  which  is  at  variable·  r'!tes,  is 
payable quarterly. 
E.  ,  BORROWING  .CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
BULGARIA ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-:-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As part of  G-24's total aid of  ECU 220 million in  1992 ·and  1993, the Commission, 
on  behalf· pf the  Community,  was  empowered  to  borrow;  in  two  tranches, 
· ECU 110 million for a  p~riod of seven years. · The. proceeds of this operation were 
to be on-lent to Bulgaria.  · 
Since the conditions for Community assistance had not been met .by the end of 1993, 
neither of  the tWo tranches have yet been paid out. 
6 F.  BORROWING CONTRACTED BY THE C01\.1MUNITY  TO GRANT ISRAEL 
J\.fEDIUM·-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As  part  of the  financial  assistance  agreed  for  Israel  and  the  population  of the 
occupied territories, the Commission was empowered to.  borrow,  on behalf of the 
Community,  ECU 160 million  in  one  tranche for  a  period  of seven  years.  The 
proceeds were to l.ie paid out to Israel on the same terms·and are·accompanied by an 
interest subsidy ofECU 27.5 million paid (rom the Community budget 
This operation started on 2 March 1992  .. The borrowing is to be repaid in full  on 
15 December 1997. 
BORROWING  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
ROMANIA l\fEDIUN1-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As  part of G-24's total ·aid  of ECU 750 million,  the Commission, on behalf of the 
· Community,  was  empowered to borrow,  in  two tranches,  ECU 375 million  for  a 
period of seven years,  The proceeds of t4is operation were to be on-lent on the 
same terms to Romania. 
The  first  tranche  of ECU 190 million  for  a  term  of seven  years  was  paid  on· 
22 January 1992.  It  will  be  repaid  in  one  instalment- on  I February  1999~ and 
interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
The  second  tranche  of ECU 185 million  for  a  term  of six  years  was  paid  on 
I April1992  and· will  be  repaid. in  one instalment  on  1~ March 1998.  Interest,  · 
which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
H  ~_Q.RRQ.WING  CONTRACTED  .BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
B-_QMANIA  ADDITION~  MEDIUM·-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
As  part of G-24's new aid of ECU 160 million,  the Cortlp1ission,  on behalf of  the 
Community, was empowered to borrow ECU 80 million for a maximum period of 
. seven years..  The proceeds of this operation were to be on-lent on the same terms 
to Romania. 
In view of  its size, the loan was paid out in a single tranche on 26 February 1993.  It 
. will  be repaid in  one instalment on 26 February 2000, and interest is payable half-
yearly. 
7 I.  BORROWING CONTRACTED BY THE COMMUNITY TO GRANT ALGERIA 
MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
The .Commission, _on  .'behalf  of the  Community,  was' empowered  to  borrow 
-- ECU 400 million  for  a  maximum  period  o(- seven  years  iri 'two  tranches  of 
ECU 250 million and ECU 150 million.  The proceeds of this ·operation were to  be 
on-,-lent ori the same terms to. Algeria.; 
·A bridging Joan  wa~ granted  ~n 23 Pecember1991  to ·cover the first  tranche and 
was repai_d from tile net proceeds ofthe borrowing  contr~cte'd on 14 January 1992 
for a period of  six y~ars.  - ·  ·  ·  · 
I  . 
The loan is  tci  be-repaid in  one instalment  on. 15 .Oecember 1997  and  interest is 
payable annually every 15  De~ember. .  .- .  ,  . 
The second tranche has not yet been paid.  .  '  .  . . 
J.  BORROWING  CONTRACTED  ·BY  THE-.  COIVfMuNITY - TO .. GRANT 
.  MEDIUM-TERM  FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  THE.  SOVIET · UNION-
AND/OR~ITS  REPUBLICS - .  . 
The Commission has proposed. a ~ediu~-term loan of  up  ~to ECU 1 250 million for·  .  , 
the  Soviet  Union and/or its Repll:blics  in  order  to~ finance  imports" of  agriculturaL 
products, foodstuffs and medicines from the Community and  E~stern Europe: 
) 
Parliament  delivered  a  favourable  opinion  a~d  · the  Council .-adopted  its  format_ ·  · · 
decision on 16 December 1991.  The guarantee heading was set up when the .  1992  . . 
·:b!Jdget was. adopted. in Decem,ber 1991.  .  , .  '> 
_, 
'  - .  ' 
The loan will be divided between the various Republics of  the former Soviet Union 
for amaxirnum period of  three years.  '  '  . 
.  Most of  the loan contracts were signed-in the ~ourse of 1992: 
-·  with . · Armenia  (ECU 38 milli~n),  Kyrgyzstan-.· (ECU 32 million), 
Turkmenistan  (ECU 45 million)  and  Moldova  . (ECU27 milliQn)  on 
· 10 July 1992;  .  .  .  _  _ 
-with Ukraine (ECU 130 million) on 13 July 1992;  ,  . 
with Belarus (ECU 1  Oi inillion):  Tajikistan-(ECU SS  million)  and  Geqrgia 
(ECU 70 million) on 24 July 1992; · .  -
·  with Russia (ECU 150 million) on  9_ September 1992;  · 
_with Russia (ECU 349 million) on 9 December 1997; 
with Kazakhstan (ECU 25.'million) on 15 December 1  992; 
.  .  .  ·,  .  ,  •  r 
8 On 5 May  1993  two further contracts were signed with Armenia (ECU 20 million) 
and Georgia (ECU io million). 
These contracts were financed through the reallocation of  ECU 30 million originally 
intended for Kazakhstan,  which stated that it  would not use all  this  amount  since 
ECU 25 million was sufficient, and a reduction in the allocation of  Uzbekistan. 
'  .  ' 
. On 6 Decemoer 1993  a further loan contract of ECU 40 inillion  was signed  with 
Georgia.  This amount  had  originally beeri  allocated to Uzbekistan (whose initial 
allocation came to ECU 129 million).  Neither Uzbekistan nor Azerbaijan (with an . 
allocation of  ECU 68 million) received Community loans in  1992-93 since they did 
not satisfy one of the· criteria for eleigibility - they do not accept joint at1d  several 
responsibility for the debt of  the former Soviet Union. 
At 31  December 1993 the amount of  loans actually being used came to ECU 802.7 
million.  This figure  corresponds to the total outstanding at the end of December 
1993.  .  .  '  . 
The capital repayment and interest payment dates for this operation vary depending 
on the amount of  the loan ·and on the-Republic:·  . ·  · 
- Armenia (ECU 38 million),  Belarus,  Georgia (ECU 70  million),  Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Russia (ECU 150 'million): 
· - interest on 20 April and 20 October 
-capital on 20 August 1995 (20 August 1994 and  1995 for Belarus, 
Ukraine and Russia) 
- Armenia (ECU 20 ~Ilion), Kazakhstan, _Russia (ECU 349 million), 
Georgia (ECU 10 niilliori and ECU 40 niillion):  . 
-interest on 15 January and 15 July  .  . 
- capitalon 15 January 1996 (15 January 1995  and  1996 for Russia 
and 15 January 1997 for Georgia (ECU 40 million)) . 
.  K ·  BORROWING CONTRACTED BY THE COMMUNITY TO GRANT 'MEDIUM 
-TERM  FINANCIAL  ASSISTANCE  TO  ESTONIA  LATVIA  AND 
!,..ITHUANIA 
As  part of the  G-24's total aid of  .ECU 440 million for these three countries, the 
Commission,  on  behalf  of  the.  Community,  was.  empowered  to  borrow 
ECU 220 million for a period of  seven years.  The proceeds of  this operation are to 
be on-lent on the same terms in two tranches: -
ECU 40 million for Estonia; 
.  . 
ECU 80 million for Latvia; 
ECU l 00 million for Lithuania. 
The  first  tranches  of the.  loan  for  Estonia  (ECU 20 million)  and  for  Latvia 
· (ECU 40 million) were paid on 31_March 1993 ..  The loans are to be repaid in one 
9 ··<. 
instalment on 31·March 2000 'and interest is payable. half-y~ly  ~very 3.1 March and · 
3·o September.  ·  ·  · · 
.  The o/st tranche for Lithuania was. paid on 27 July 1993;  it is  to be repaid  ip.  one  ·· 
· . instalment on'27 July 2000 and' ~nterestis payable: annually every 27 July: 
"· 
lO / 
Ill.  COMMUNITY GUARANTEE TO NON-COMMUNITY COUNTRIES 
A  . EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  LOANS  TO  :MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES GUARANTEED BY THE GENERAL BUDGET 
Under  the- terms  of the  Council  Decision  of. 8 March 1977,  the  Conimunity 
guarantees loans to be granted  by  the European Investment Bank as ·part of the 
Community's financial commitments towards the Mediterranean countries. 
This decision was  the basis for  the contract of guarantee signed ·by  the European 
Economic Community and  the European Investment Bank on 30 October 1978  in 
Brussels  and  10 November' 1978  in  Luxembourg  introducing  a  global  guarantee 
of75% on  all. credit  lines  made  available  for  loans  in  the  following  countries:· 
Portugal  (Financial  Protocol,  pre-accession  aid),  Greece,  Spain·  (financial 
cooperation),· Malta,  Tunisia,  Algeria,  Morocco,  Turkey,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Jordan, 
Syria, Israel, Yugoslavia and  Lebanon.  · · 
. In  addition,  by .  way ·of exception,  a  100% gilarantee  covers  loans  allocated  for . · 
--emergency  aid  to  Portugal  in  accordance  with.  the  Council  Decision  of 
7 October 1975. 
A new extension of the contract of  guarantee is established for each new Financial. 
Protocol.  ·  · 
The·.  loans  authorized  at  31  December 1993 .  total  ECU 7 667 million,  of which 
-ECU 1 500 million is for Spain, Greece and Portugal and E~U  6 167 million for the 
non-member  Mediterranean  countries.  At  31  December 1993  the  total  of 
outstanding loans came to ECU 2168 million (taking account of  the 75% limit), of 
which  ECU 572 million  was  accounted  for  by  Spain,  Greece  and  P~rtugal and 
ECU 1 596 million by the non-:-inember Mediterranean countries. 
There  is  also  prpvision  for  EIB  loans  outside .  these  protocols · under·  Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1763/92 of  29 June 1992 concerning financial  cooperation in 
respect of  all Mediterranean non-member countries. 
-EIB loans under this operation must not exceed ECU 1 800 million .. 
At  3 I.  December 1993  ECU 317 million  had  been  · made  available  but '  no 
disbursements had taken place. 
in J~ly I99J the Council decided to  ~onclude a riew protocol with the-Republic of 
Slovenia  in  order  to .finance  projects  to  contribute  to  the country's  economic' 
development through loans totalling ECU 150 million from the.EIB's own resources 
for a period of  up to five years with a f?udget guarantee .. 
I  '  .  . 
11 .. 
I 
At 31 ·December 1993, ·.the breakdown of authorizations by  country (  non:__m~mber  ·. 
countries only) was as follows: 
'· 
Algeria· 
.,  ' 
~ 
640 
Cyprus  92 
Egypt 
'  802  Israel 
Jordan  215 
'/ 
Lebanon 
•' 
198 
·Malta  . '222 
.Morocco·  55 
" 
Slovenia  -
Syria 
·,  517 
Turiis\a  i50 
·Turkey  208 
·.  Yugoslavia~l  -418 
I 
;.•, 
90  . 
"  760  --
'Protocols"" Total  4367. 
'·  ·- - '· 
Horizontal.  financial•  1800 
cooperation  .  ,• 
· Mediterranean·- Total  6167 
The loaris  are gener')..lly  for 15 years  with~ 3 to 4-year periods :or grace on  ~apital 
repayments.  '  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  .  . 
..  '. 
The  secoi).d  p'rc:itocoi  wi·th ·Yugoslavia  was  suspended.  when 
E:;CU  100. million of  credits  could still be  granted. 
12  .. 
'  . /. B ..  LOANS  GRANTED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  IN 
COUNTRIES OF.CENTRAL A.tl\ID EASTERN EUROPE 
In  response  to a  call' -made  by. the ·Council ·on  9 October 1989,  the  Board  ·of. 
Governors of the European Investment Bank decided  on  29 November 1989  to 
authorize the Bank to provide loans from its own resources to finance investment 
projects in Hungary. and Poland for a total amount not exceeding ECU l billion. 
These loans  are granted to finance  investment  projects which  satisfY  the Bank's 
usual requirements for loans 1rom its own resources.  The -contract of  guarantee-was 
signed on 24 April1990 fu Brussels and 14 May 1990 in Luxembourg.  · 
On 14 May 1991 :the budgetary authority extended this guarantee to loans made in 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania up ·to a maximum ofECU 700 million. 
The -extension ·ofthe contract of  guarantee was signed on  31 July 1991. 
On 23 Octob'er1992 the Comrtiission presented a _proposal  for a CounCil Decision 
extending this 'Cortl:inunity guarantee to losses incurred ·by the EiB as a result of 
loans . granted· to Estonia,  Latvia  and  .Lithuania~ this  has been  approved ·by  the 
budgetary -authority.  ·  · 
. The ·overall ceiling ·on loans which the EIB may grant m  these ·countries was set at 
ECU 200 million 'for -a period of  three years.  · 
On  18 December 1992  the  Commission  also  proposed  ·the  ext~nsion  of this 
guarantee to 'losses inc4rred by the EIB as a result of  loans granted in Albania. 
On 13 Deceml?er l993 the :budgetary authority :renewed t~e Community guarantee 
. . for ·a period of  three years for loans granted by the EIB in the countries of Central 
and Eastern· -Europe (including the Baltic States .and Albania} up to a maximum of 
ECU l  billion. 
·The loans ate generally long-term:  l5 years. on average with 3 to 4-year periods of 
grace on capital.tepayments. 
At 31  'DeCember  ·19~3, ECU 1·655  million -had  been made available in the Central 
and Eastern European countries but only ECU 300  -million had been disbursed. 
l3 !  . 
;  I 
,C.  LOANS GRANTED BY THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK IN·NON-. 
MEMBER-COUNTRIES 
At  its- meeting  of _19 May 1992_  the  Council  (Economic  and  Financial  Affairs) 
adopted  the  guidelines  ·proposed-by  the _Cqmmission .for  the  extension--of EIB 
activities outside the Community and asked it to grant -loans in accordance with. its 
statutes and its usual criteria to projects of mutual interest in countries with which 
the Cominunity has concluded cooperation agreements.  , 
An overall  limit of ECY 250 million per year has been set for a 3-year p~riod; this 
_  ceiling Will be reView:ed at the end of  the period.·  ·  j.  • 
'.  .  I\ 
These  loans  ~enefit  from  Comniuruty · budget  guarantees.  The  Commission . 
- .  presef!ted. a- proposal  for  a  decisi,on  to this  effect. on. 3 June 1992.  The  formal 
Council Decision followed  on l5 February 1993._  The contract of guarantee was 
signed ori 4 Novemp-er 1993 in Brussels and on 17 November 1993 in Luxembourg. 
· The budgetary authority inserted a heading for this purpose in  the 1993 budget · 
'  .  . 
:At  31  December  1993  credit -lines  of ECU 99 million  had  .been  signed  but  no 
·disbursements ha~  taken place.  · 
. D.  COMMuNITY CREDIT GUARANTEE FOR EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL 
· PRODUCTS  AND  FOODSTUFFS  FROM  THE  COJ\1MUNITY  TO  THE 
·  ·FORMER SOVIET UNION 
The_ Community has decided to guanintee loans granted to the former Soviet Union_· 
· by  a. pool  pf banks  to  financ~ imports  of agricultural  product's  and foodstuffs 
. originating in  ~he Conuriunity and the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe.  . 
The Coriununity guarantee covers 98%,  up to a ma:ximum  of ECU 500 million, ·of · · 
any  Josses  ' in.  principal  (around  ECU 408 million)  ·and  intere'st  (around  . 
.  • ECU 92 million).  ·_  -_·.  · ·  ·  ·  ·_  . 
. . As the credit line has n_ot been used in full and as the time limit for us~ has not been 
extended;.the amount guaran~eed  ~omes  to only ECU 375.5 million in_ principal and ·, · 
ECU 80.3 million in interest. 
The  Community  will  receive· a· surety  commission  of0.67%  of the. amount  • 
guaranteed in consideration for this guarantee. · Half of  this commission was paid on· 
2_6 December 1991  under the terms of the contract.  The balance corresponding to . 
the Community guarantee was paid on 28 January 1993..  · 
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-. On 26 November 1991  the terms of  the loan and the arrangements for the utilization 
of the funds  wen~ laid down in an exchange of letters between the Comrriission and  · 
the Soviet authorities.  On the same  day  th~ Community and  the banks  signed  a 
. contract of  guarantee. 
.  . 
Following the disappearance of  the Soviet Union, it has been decided that the funds 
will be used by the Russian Republic.  ·  . · .  · · 
The loan is for ·three and a half years from the. date of  signature. 
·Interest  will  be  payable  half-yearly  and  the  principal will  be  repaid  in  three 
instalments, 20, 31  and 42 months after the agreement has been signed. 
The  first  interest  payment  was  due  on  9 September 1992  and  was  made -on 
25  September 1992.  · · 
The  second  interest  payment  was  due  on  9 March 1993  and  was  made  on·  · 
2 April  1993  together  with· -the  ·interest  for  late  payment  of  the  September 
instalment., 
The capital repayment due on 26 July  1993  and the third interest payment due on·· 
9 September 1993  were made on  18 Novemb.er 1993  together with the interest for 
t.ate payment of  the instalments due on .9 March and 26 July'. .  I 
PART TWO:·. RISK SITUATION 
-There are two possible inethods for evaluating the ris~s Qome by the Com,n1l1nity budg~t: 
the method, often used by bankers, ofthe total amount ofcapitaJ outstanding for. 
the operations concerned on a given date;  .  •  .  . 
the  more· budgetary- approa~h ·  oCcalcl.datirig  the- max~mum amount  which  the 
· Community could have to pay out in each financial year.  · 
.  .  ,  .  .  .  .  ~  .  .  - .  .  I 
The second approach itself  has· been applied in· two different ways: _ 
.  .  ; 
by  reference  only  to· actual  disbursements  at  31  'December 1993,  giving  the 
minimum  level  of risk to  the  Community  assuming·. that  there  are ·rio . early 
repaym~nts; 
on a: more forward-looking basis,  by reference to all the  operation~ proposed by 
the Commission in  order to estimate ·the  impact  on  future  budgets,  givirig the· 
maximum risk borne by the Community assuming that the Commission's proposals 
: are accepted.  .  .·  . 
For  the  latter ·  exerc_ise  a  number  of assumptions  have  to. be  made  about  dates .  of' 
. disbursement, terms of repayip.ent,  interest ·and exchange rates; etc.;  details are given in  · 
·the annex. -However,· this  method does  give·  sonie idea. about the future  level  of risks 
connected with ~he proposals made.  · '  · 
The  result~ are shown in the attached tables,  which assess the risk  relating to  c~untries · 
. i_nside  th~Community.and  countries outside the Community.  ,  .  · 
The overall figures quoted c~~er  .risks of-different types;  loan; to one co~ntry  in the_ case 
of financial  assistance and ·loans· for projects· guaranteed by the borrowers. in jhe:  case of 
· NCI and Em operations, for example.  _  ..  ·  ·  .·  .  ·  . '  ·  .  ·  ·  ··  · 
- .  - '  .  .  ' 
. The following  analysis 'distinguishes. between total risk,  the risk  in  respect  of  'Member ..  ·· 
. States .and the risk in respect ofnon-member countries.  .  . 
j 
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I.  TOTAL RISK 
A.  AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 31 DECEMBER 1993 (Table 1) 
The total risk at 3 1 December 1993 came to EC U 14 3 77 million,  12% ·more than at-
30 June 1992.  ·  ; ·  · 
B.  MAXIMUM ANNUAL  RISK BORNE BY  THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT 31 DECEMBERJ993 (Table 2) 
The  total  risk,  which  came.  to  ECU 3 270 million  in  1993,  will  drop  to 
· ECU 2 766 million in 1994 after which it will rise to ECU 3 033 million in  1996 and 
then fall again before increasing to ECU 3 204 million in 2000_ 
C.  MAXIMUM  THEORETICAL  ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY  THE 
COMMUNITY BUDGET (Table 3) 
This  risk  comes  to  ECU 3 200 million  in  1994  and  will·  increase  gradually  to 
ECU 4 317 million  in  1996;  it  will  fall  to ECU 4 050 million  in  1997,  increase  to 
ECU 4 675 million in 1998, fall again in 1999 and reach ECU 7 971  million in 2000. 
H.  RISK IN RESPECT OF THE MEMBER STATES 
.A.  AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 31  DECEMBER 1993 (Table 1) 
B. 
The amount of capital outstanding in  respect qf operations in  the Member States 
came to ECU 8 982 million at 31  December 1993,  an increase of 15.6% compared 
with 30 June 1992. 
This  increase  is  mainly  due  to  the  operation  in  Italy  which  accounts  for 
ECU 3 990 million. 
The amount outstanding from the other operations ha~ fallen or remained stable. 
MA.XIMUM  ANNUAL  RISK BORNE BY  THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT 31 DECEMBER 1993 (Table 2)  , 
The risk fQr  1993 came to ECU 2 744 million. 
The risk will drop to ECU 2 091  million in  1996 and will  again fall  to·  a very low 
level in  1999 (ECU 291  million) before rising to ECU 2 771  million  in  2000 when 
part  of the  loan  granted  to  Italy  falls  due  (ECU 2 655 million· in ·principal  and 
interest).. 
17 C.  MAXIMUM  THEEORETICAL , ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY  .  THE: . · 
. COMMUNITY BUDGET (.Table 3) 
The trend is the same as in the preVious case up to I996 when the risk will amount 
to ECU  2 638 million.  It will then drop to ECU I 983 million in  1997, and increase 
·to ECU 2 596 million in 1998 before reaching.,a peak ofECU 5 827 million:in 2000. 
.  ~. 
m.  RISK IN RESPECT OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES.· 
A.  AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 31 DECEMBER1993 (Table 1) 
The  amount  of·  c;apital  -outst~ding ·  at  31 .  December I993  came .  to 
ECU 5 395 million, an increase of  6.4% ~ompared  with 3'0 June 1993. 
The increase in the first half o(the year was 20.5%: 
B.  MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: 
. OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT 31 DECEMBER  1993 (Table 2) 
The· risk for  I993 came to ECU 526 million  ~md will-increase 'to ECU I 597 million 
in i 995, mainly because two repayments of  principal-then fall due:  ~  . 
.  ~  .  ....  .  . 
.  .  . 
ECU 3 50 million from Hungary; 
ECU 5Il mi~liort from the Republics of  the former Soviet Union ... · 
.  .  .  .  '' 
Therisk Will  drop' in  1996.and increase againin 1997 to ECU 1 276 million as the 
(ollowing payments fall due: 
ECU80 m.illionJrom Htingaiy;  .  . 
ECU 190 million from the Czech and Slovak Republics;  . 
·  ·.  ECU 140niillion from Bulgaria; 
ECU 250 million from .Algeria;  .· 
··  ECU 160million.from ISrael .. 
· ....  · 
At  ECU 988 million  .the risk will  be  smaller but. still  at a high. level  in ·1998,  but 
'should fall to:less t}l~n ECU SOO  mill,ion in 1999 and 2900  ..  '  .  .  · . .  ·  ·  · 
"· 
.j 
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C.  MAXIMUM  THEORETICAL  ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY  THE 
COMMUNITY  BUDGET (Table 3) 
The risk for 1995 shouldcome-to ECU i.o5£ million; in particular," the Republics of 
. the former Soviet Union are to repay principal ofECU 653 million that year; · 
The risk will drop to ECU I 680 million iri  1996, rise again to ECU 2 067 million in 
1997,  ECU 2 079 million  in  · 1998,.  ECU 2 11 7 million  . in  , 1999  and 
ECU 2 144 million in 2000. 
./ 
. f 
·.19 .  .  . 
lV.  ACTIVATION OF GUARANTEEs-
In~the second·halfof 1993, the Em again called on the budget guar~tee in respect  .! 
o(  loans of  around ECU 6.1  million to the Republics of  former Yugoslavia (Bosnia:.. 
-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Serbia) .. Payments ofECU 13.5 million were _made to . 
the E~  on 7 September and 10 December 1993.  - .. _  ·  ·  · ,  . 
At  31  Dec~inber  the · Republics  of former  Yugoslavia  still -had - to  repay 
ECU28.6 million in resp~ct of  debts paid by  t~he Commuriity.  __ 
The Coriunission .also  made payments frbm  its cash_ reso~rces. under Article 12  of · 
Council  Regulation  . No  -1552/89  _of.  29 May 1989  implementing  -Decision 
88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of'the Communities' own resources:  .  _-.  , .. 
payment of' principal and interest-due from Russia on 26 Jidy and  interest 
due on 9 September ·1993  in  respe~  _of a loan granted by a consortium of  . 
. banks and g-Uaranteed by ~he Community;  · 
payment of  interest: 
.  - .  .  .  '  \  '  .·, 
due  from  three Republicsof the former Soviet  Union- (Russia,  Aimtmia, 
Kazakhstan)· Qn  1  ~July 1993_ in· respect .of the_ borrowing  and.  lending 
operation ~f  ECU I 250 million for !hese Republics, 
.  ·~/. 
due from nine Republics oftheforrn:er So~et  Uruon on 26 October 1993_ in· 
respect of  the  .~arne operation,  - ·  · 
' , due- froin. Algeria 'and  Bulgaria on  15  December  1993  ·in_ r~spect_ of the 
loans and financial  a~sistance·granted to each of  these cou~tries  . 
. Thesepayments were eventually made by'the ciebtors.concerned, exceptin the case 
. _of Tajikistan which ~ad still not settled its debt-on 31  Decet:nber 1993.  · 
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PART THREE:  CHANGES IN POTENTIAL RISKS 
The figures given in the previous parts provide information on the quantitative aspects of . 
the risks borne by the general budget. ··  .  .  ·  .  · 
However, these data should be weighted in accordance with aspects relating to the quality 
of  the risk, which depend on the type of  operation and the standing of  the borrower.  .  '  . 
I.  TYPES OF OPERATION 
The risks to which the above figures relate derive from a variety of  operations which . 
can be divided into two categories:  operations with macroeconomic objectives and 
those with microeconomic objectives.  · 
. A.·  OPERATIONS WITH MACROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
' 
The first  of these are the balance of payments loans for Member States, normally 
carrying strict economic conditions and undertakings.  '  .  .  .· 
Financial  assistance  operations  are  similar  in  nature  but. are. intended  for  non-
member countries. 
Finally, this  cate~ory includes the credit guarantee of  ECU 500 million and the loan · 
ofECU 1 250 million to finance imports of  agricultural products and foodstuffs into 
the Soviet Union, since the risk involved in these two operations depends to a large 
extent on macroeconomic and political developments in the country. 
l3.  OPERATIONS WITH MICROECONOMiC OBJECTIVES 
These are loans to finance specifi.c  projects which are usually repaid over the long 
term from funds which these projects are expected to generate;  as a rule, they· are 
granted  to  State  companies  or  financial  institutions  and,  in  addition  to  the 
. Community guarantee, are covered by the usual guarantees demanded by banks. 
They are the Euratom and NCI loans in Member States and the Euratom· and EIB  · 
loans outside the Community (Mediterranean ·and Central and Eastern Europ~). 
21 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THIRD COUNTiuES · 
'  RECEIVING EU ASSISTANCE UNDER  OPERATIONS WITH 
.  MACRO-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES5  . 
A  •. ALG:ERIA 
1.  .  General economic situation 
GDP. registered a  7% decline in ·1993.  Apart from the  ·gene~al climate of  insecurity,  . 
·economic activity was hampered by a shortage of  inputs,  spar~ parts and equipment goods 
due to a very stri~t administrative 'control of  th~ use of  available foreign exchange 
resources.  The financial situation of  t.he enterprise sector further deteriorated and ·ihdustry 
~ubsidies continued to weigh heavily on the state. budget.  The government budget deficit· 
deteriorated substantially to an unsustainable level of 14.9«yo ()fGDP. ·Growing  . 
· government ~d  state enterprises defiCits resulted·in increased credit volumes and a 
.  groWth in the bro-ad money supply by 21%. . .  .  .  .·  .  - ·~  .. 
In spite of  these inflationary pressures;'  inflation  actu~ly  slowed down from 3  2% end 1992 
to 16% end 1993.  This can only be explained in. the light of  continued administrative price 
controls and coercion, especially:in the state enterprises sector.  · 
2.  .  The balance-of payments 
Export revenues, generated almost exclusively by hydr~carbon products; dimirushed by 
almost 20% as world oil prices· fell .. Given the strict foreign exchange allocation system 
established end 1992, this has provoked a sharp_deciine in iinports, from arourid US$.10 
billion in 1992 to US$ 7.8 billion only in 1993  .• The current account surplus declined to 
around US$ l.billion.  In view oftheeconomic and secuiity situation, fo~eign investments 
virtually disappeared.  As the economic programme agreed with the IMF went off-track in 
. 1992 aQd no new programmes were ~greed!uponin 1993, officiai medium and long term 
financing resources diminished and were replaced,· to a limhed extent, ·by short-term 
commercial credits:  .  . 
· The exchang~  rat_e also remai~ed  under"a,dministrative control and depreciated by 5. 5% 
only, thus·lea.ding to a substantial appreciation of  the real effective exchange rate ·and' a'·. 
consequent loss of  competitiveness for domestic'industrie~.  The margin between the 
· official exchange rate and the parallel market rate widened to neafly 160%. 
.  .  -
3.  Foreign debt 
' 
In 1993, on average about 90% of  all export revenues were used to serviCe a foreign debt 
sto~k of  so_me·US$ -26.3 bijlion, requiring US$ 2) billion in interest payments and US$ · 
7.1 billion in repayments of  principal.  Nearly three quarters of  this debt- stock consists of 
publicly guarimteed private sector credits.  Non-gtlaranteed credits are non-e'xistant. 
This ~ection also provides information on the republics of.the torm~r  Soviet Union. 
22. About 13% are bilateral credits, mostly non"'-concessional.  Short-term debt is marginal in 
the total stock, although its share may have_ increased recently. 
Towards the end of 1993, Algeria started, for the first time, to run into arrears on debt 
· service.  These may be, initially, ·of a purely technical nature.  But the negative trend in 
export revenus, due to decreasing oil prices, causes concern as it undermines Algeria's · 
debt service capacity.  By the end of  the year; the debt service-to-exports ratio· climbed to 
close to 100%, up from an already very high 72% in late I 992.  This created a situation 
which is unsustainable in the.long run as t~e administrative compression of  imports, in · 
order to ensure external debt service, .  erodes th~ economy's productive capacity and 
creates consumer hardship. .  As this. situation continued to aggravate early 1994, ex.ternal 
debt reprofiling or  reschedul~ng operations are now contemplated by the authorities. 
23 B.  BULGARIA_ 
1.  .·General  e~onomic  situation 
St~bilization and reform in Bulgari~  slowe~ down ifr1993: The btidget deficit .deteriorated 
significantly to som~ 11% ofGDP.(against 7% ayear  earlier)~ Financial,discipline within 
state-owned enterprises alsq weakened.  Wi~hvirtually no external financing, the budget 
d_eficit was financed t1Irough domes1ic bank :credit Inflation remained high, at 64% in the ..  ·. 
year to December J  993 (79% in 1992). Real' GDP is  estimated to have dropped by J to  · 
. 4% in 1993. U11einployrnent roseto around 16% of  the labour force in the first months of 
199\  it stabilized since. On the side of  structural reform, .the results of 19.93 were  · 
disappointing although restitution of  land anq urba.IJ. property advaqced·  . 
. · In December· 1993, the .Bulgarian authorities r~ached ari agreement with the IMF s~aff  on 
art economic progl-amme fqr 1994 that could be supported by a new twelve-month stand-
by· arrangement. The programme is intended to restore domestic and exte~al  balan~es (it  . 
aims in particular to halve inflation -to 30%  by year  .:.end) and accelerate the  .,_  .  . 
transf.ormatio~  p~ocess, mainly in the areas o£fJnanciat sector reform a~d  pri~atiza!ion. 
2.  The balance of payments · 
B4lgaria's extern~ financial situation remained ~~itk  in 1993. Exports in convertible 
currencies that had grown in 1992 are likely to have remained stable (clearly, export 
·performance in 1993 was. adversely affected by  ·UN sanctions against Serbia and ·  ·  · 
... Montenegro), while imports increased somewhat. As a result, the  .tnide b~llance shifted 
· .  from a slight s4q)lus in ·1992 to a deficitofsome. $0.5 billion (about 4% of  GDP), and the 
· current account deficit approached· $1  billion, The effects of  the, sanctions {their impact on · . 
. .  .  tl)e current acco·unt is .estimated by the IMF at up to $700 million in 1993) were 
. compound.ed by lack of  official external financing following .the failure of  Bulgaria to .  .  .. 
com::~ude a stand-by arrangement with the IM.F before the very end of1993: Bulgaria also 
remained cut off  from ·private fimmcing as it  did virtually no ser-Vicing of  the country's 
commercia.! debt inherited-from the previous regime. Foreign direct in\:estment remained 
· margi_nal.despite. a particularly ~iberal foreign investment law.  ·.  ' 
However, the national currency remained relatively stable iri nominal temi.s until Oct()bei-
1993, resulting in a strong real appreciation. Since then; there has been·a·shafiJ ·.  . 
depreciation of  the Lev. The Central Bank tried to limit it by raising interest rates and by · 
intervening on the interbank foreign exchange market These interventions amounted to 
some $250 millionover the last three months of1993, and internationalresei-ves declined 
. to $700 millio.n at the end of  the year; against some $1 billfon in 1<592.-.  . 
In 1994, the trade balance is expected to ~mprove marginally and the current acc·ount · 
deficit to decline to $0.8 billion. The financing of  the current account deficit; of  the .  . 
.. tipfront cost of  the DDSR agreement with the. commercial banks (see below) and ofa 
moderate increase in international reserves is assumed to' be provided rrirunly through debt 
relief and officialfinancial. support: In this.cont'ext, the Bulgarian authorities  have · 
requested assistance from the Community and the G-24 for sbme $330 million.  · 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .·  ~  .  . 
.24. 3.  Foreign debt 
Bulgaria's external debt is estimated at $14 billion (equivalent to the GDP, or 4oo% of 
exports). It  incl~des about $9.5 billion owed to some 300 commercial banks, out ofwhich 
about. half of  which is made up of  interest arrears (some $2 billion) and arrears on short-
term deposits and letters of  credit. The debt-service ratio is arou~d 70% of  exports. 
In November 1993, Bulgaria reached an agreement in principle with the country's  . 
commercial creditors on the parameters of  a comprehensive debt and debt service 
reduction (DDSR) deal. The reduction of  the debt stock and of  the debt servi~ing will be 
implemented through debt buy-backs and long-term securities (discount bonds at 50% of 
face value and interest reduction bonds). In the long run, the deal, which the parties hope 
will be implemented by mid-1994, is likely to improve substantially the country's prospects 
for attaining a viable external financial position. In the short run, however, it will cost 
Bulgaria up to $900 million upfron~ - more than the Central Bank's present international 
reserves. After the announcement of  the agreement, the price of  the Bulgarian debt on the 
secondary market, that had fluctuated below 30% earlier in 1993 (it was at about only 
20% in 1992), soared to almost 40%. It has decreased since then. 
Bulgaria will also need in i  994 to negotiate a. new official debt rescheduling with the Paris 
Club (the previous agreement with the official creditors, concluded in December 1992, 
. came to its end in April 1993 ). It is expected that the 9fficial creditors will grant Bulgaria · 
the same traditional rescheduling terms as in the past. Since their agreement with the 
commercial banks, however, the Bulgarian authorities have repeatedly indicated their 
.  . 
intention to seek similar treatment froin the Paris Club. 
\.  . 
25 C.  THE CZECIJ REPUBLIC 
1.  'General economic situation 
Helped bythe recoveryofdomestic.  d~mimd.  and a. strong perfonmmc~ of  conve~ible. 
exports, realGDP iQ the ·czech Republic is estimated to have groWn betweenO and l% iri 
1993, the :first positive rate since real output began declining in 1990. The uneniploymtmt 
. rate_has:remained at verylo,Wlevels (3.5%~at·ehd-1993). In 1994, the economy is  · · · 
· .e}(pected to grow by 1-:3%.· .· 
Following a 8:5% price jump in January 1993 associated with the'inl~oduction in that 
m<;mth oftheVf\.T, inflation cairie down rapidiy to about0.5% per  .. month in March-July, 
ending the yearat'l8.2%. ·  ··  ·  · 
Speculation against die curiency, unfavourable wage and price deyelopments and the need  · 
'  ·~  to drain ~he·  excess bank liquidity that resulted from the, conversion of  cash holdings' and ' '  ' 
·  bank deposits ~head of  the currency split, led th~ Czech National Bank to tighten  ...  · 
monetary policy in  the first months ofthe:year. However, since the end of  April 1993  · 
·.  monetary policy has been gradually ease<f Regarding fiscal policy, the state budget 
:finished 1993  with~  a s,mall surplus. For 1994, the govetl1Illent has presented a balam:~ed 
budget.  ·  · 
As far  as structural reforni-is'concetned: the. second waye oflarge-scal~  privatizatio~ is  .. 
already underway; As was the case·in the, first wave, almost ·.One third' of  the assets will; be 
sold through t~e voucher method. The second \¥ave shotlld be compleie~ by_end-J99{by· · 
which time about 90% of  the assets  of  th~ econonw will be in private hands. '  ' 
· 2.  ·  The balance of payments 
The Czech  curr~rit account (excluding transfers to Slovak  citizens. of  shares in enterprises .. 
privatized iht~e  first wave ofvoucl_ler:~privatization) istentatively'estirilatedto have 
posted iq.1993 a surplus of  some US$ 6DO mio (1.9% ofGDJ>). This isa surprisingly  _ 
·  gobd'fesult given the: acceleration ofdomestic demand and imports ~d  the weakness of -
the Czech Republic's mairi export markets._  · ·  · ·  -
··  ·.-After contracting by about 40% in the first quarter of 1993, trade with Slovakia has 
'' recoveryd somewhat ·and is now estimated to have declined by about 20% in the whole of 
'' 1993 'In recent months, the surplus of  the clearing !lCCOUnt with Slovaki'a has been  ' 
giowing.rapidly. In response,_ in early December, the Czech crown was,revalued by 3% · 
. against the clearing ECU and the Slovak crown w~s  deva.lued by 5%.  In early March 
1994  ~ however, the revaluation of  Czech cro'Yfl.wAs fully reversed iri reaction to the  · 
···.introduction by Slovakia of a  10%im.port surcharge.  ·  · 
· · Although the net inflowofFDI slowed down  :in  1993 to US$ 450 mio (from l!S$ 983 mio 
in 1992), the_ Czech Republic has been experiencing a surge in other'  capital inflows sirice .. 
-· the third quarter of 1993: Thus, net portfolio·invesi,ment reached in 1993 abollt US$ 700. 
mio and Czech enterprises borrowed abroad US$ 750 mio(basically in the  form ofbank 
· credits). Furthermore, the Czech National. Bank successfully placed several  ·intematioi1hl 
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~  . : borid "issues last year. This r~latively high degree of  access of  the Czech Republic to the 
international capital markets has been reinforced by the ~pgrading  to aninvestmenfgrade . . 
.  of  Moody's rating (p-orn the Bal previously assigned to  the CSFR, to Baa3) and.bythe 
· assignment by Standard and Poor~sof  a comparable BBB rating ..  · 
1 
·  .  ·  · 
•, · :The combination of  a healthy current account position and a strong capit~ inflow ha~ put 
upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate and has resulted in a rapid growth of' . 
·.official foreign exchange reserves, which stood at US$ 3.8 bn at end-1993, compared to 
US$ 0.7 bn at end-1992. In order to s~em  the .upward pressure on the'e){change rate," the 
Czech National Bank is planning to make the.crown fully convertible for current account- • 
transactions and to liberalize controls on capital outflows in a phased manner  .. 
.  ·  •  •  '  r  •  '  ••  •  . 
Despite rec;ent speculation on a possiblereva:luation of  the Czech crown, the ~rrency,has 
·remained stable against the refer~nce basket of  Western currencies used to peg its value. 
·  _The persistence of  a significant inflation-differential between the Czech Republic and its 
. main trading partners, however, has continued to appreciate the·real exchange rate~ w.hich. 
stands now at a level similar to that which prevaileq before the 1990 devaluations.  '  .  .  .  .  - ' 
The oo·  approved a 12-month, SDR 177 mio stand-by credit tO. the Czech Republic in 
March 1993. Granted in the wake of  the sharp decline in rese_rves that accompanied the 
dissolution of  the· C SFR, the credit aimed at providing an early boost to reserves and 
helping the Czech authorities reestablish international confidence in its policies. 
...  .  ..  '  '  .  . 
· .. The c~rrent account surplus is proj,ected to disappear irt 1994 and tum into a deficit of 
about '2% of  GDP in 199  5, reflecting the acceleration of  domesti~ demand and imports 
· and a further appreciation of  the real ·exchange rate.  Such a detenoration in the current. 
· account, however, is expeCted to be amply financed by a continued surge in.the inflow of 
private capital, resulting in a further increase in foreign exchange reser\tes in those years. 
.  .  :  .  .  .  ~  . 
3.  Foreign debt 
.  Despite a significant growth of  convertible ·debt in 1993,  m~stly  associated with strong 
· foreign borrowing by Czech companies, the Czech Republic continues to  .enjoy a low 
foreign debt burden~ Total convertible debtis estimated to have increased from US$ 6.9 · 
bn at end-1992 to US$ 9.0 bn at end-1993; but this still implies a relatively low debt/GDP . 
·ratio o(28.7% and a comfortable 55  .  .3% debt/exports ratio. At US$· L5 bn in 1993, total 
debt service also ;emains moderate, having even decreased as a percentage of  exports 
(from 9.5% in 1992 to 8.9%).  While projections for 1994 point towards an increase in.all-
deb~ and debt service indicators, t~ey are expected to· remain at fairly reasonable levels. 
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' - ~-. D.  'ESTONIA 
·  L  ..  ·  General economic situation 
Following sharp <?Utput  9ontraction~ in 1991. (-12%) and 1992(-23%) and a further. 
·.  decline in the :first~ half  of1993, the economic situation in Estonia  'improved considedtbiy , 
in the. second  half of  1993. rhe economic rebound, whichjs expected to continue in 1994',  .. 
reflects the successful implementation ofthe Estonian progra.nniie ·or macroeconomic ,  ·  ·  · 
stabilization and reform·backed by  th~ first IM;F stand-by progratnme  (mid.:; 1992 to nud:..  . 
·1993 ), its reorientation towards Western markets and support from the international .  · 
community~ The official unemployment rate barely rose in the course O:f last year; with · 
·  ·.  · only 1. 7%, it does not yet reflect the production decline of;the early  I9~0's.  .  · 
.·.  .  ·.,  .  '.  .  ·.  .  '.  /·: ;_  .  ·.  •'  .·  '  -·  .  .  .  .  . 
·  The Estonian authoritie~ have been very successful-in cutting inflation from 954% iri 1992  .. 
, (year-end) to,36% in i993. ;_Apart from the virtual 9ompl~tion of  price liberaJizatiori by  •. 
. ·the end of 1992, this is dueto the  _strict monetary incomes policies. The central bank is_ 
·.  also·prQhibited fromextepding c.rediis to the Government which has-been able to balance 
' its budget in 1993,foll6wihg a small surplus in 1992.·  .  '  .  . 
Estonia has ;nad~ qmtimiing  progress on structural refonn. In  1993, Estonia advanced 
further·in the area of  privatization; esp~cially for sinail. enterprises. The Estonian  ..  -~  _  · 
.  Privatiza,tion Office was also created to bett~r coordinate poli~~es towards  the ~nterptjse 
· .·  sector: In some cases  th~ bankruptcy  .law was applied. Banking supervision was improv~d. 
·Following the banking crisis of 1993, ·the banking system was restructured: Estonia.·  · · 
maintained liberat foreign trade and investment laws. .  .  /  .  ..  ·  · 
.  '.  .  ~ 
/'  .· 
2. ·  The balance of payments.  '.  '. 
·,... 
In: 1.992, Estorua'& current account was roughly in balance i~steadof  a projected US$ 180 
·  mio deficit. The better .than expecte(l:perfomiancewas lctrgeiy due to a dynamic expansion 
ofexports of  goods to  indt~strialiZed countries, lirrtitingthe trade deficit to some US$ 50. 
'mio, and in9reasingty also from services  -earnings. In 1993, .imports from Western. 
countries gre-wvery dynamically (101%). Thetrade deficit widened to some US$150mio · 
. and the current account turned into deficit despite vigorous'' export expansion and ail .  . 
increased s~rplus in the seiVices account:. It  is likely that  the strengthening of  domestic. 
' demand and the gradual reduct;ion ofthe comparative advantage will lead to ·a further • 
. deterioration of  the current acceurit in1994...  ,'  . 
The capital acco~t~urph.is  observed in i992:-(US$.109 mip) e~panded further in f9'93, 
.  'giveri the inflow of  foreign official  ~capt  tal and an increase of  foreign dir~ct. investment 
from US$ 58 mioin 1994. The.continuedcapital'inflowwas supported by. Estonia's liberal 
· foreign e~cbange  and inv~stm~ntlaw.  and the stability ofjts curren<;y.(peggedto the D-
Mark:under a currency board.system since !une 1992f It pei:mitted the: Bank of  Estonia~  · . 
to accumulate reserves in the order of  US$ 200 rllio ii1 1992 and some US$ 1  OQ  mio in 
"  .•  ~ 993, to a levelequ}valent to about4.5 moriths of  go~}is  i~ports  .. 
t' 
·'·.· 3.  F~reign  ·debt · 
In the course of 1993, Estqnia's external debt increased from US$ 38 mio.to US$ 168. mio 
· ·(nearly 10% ofGDP). Nearly half of  the increase in 1993 is due to purchases from the  . 
. /  ·  .. 
Fund (US$ 59 mio).  D~bt  service stabilized at $20mio in1992 and 1993, with the ratioto 
exports of  goods and services declining f!om 3.2% to 2%. 
;  . 
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E.  .HUNGARY,. 
1.  . General economic situation 
hi spite of  a clear recovery of  industr,ial prdduction in the second half of  the ye_~r; reai . 
· GDP is estimated to have declined by 1% in 1993, ba-sically as a result of  the sharp fall of 
agricultural output and the partly related c9llapse of  exports.· After a peak in March 1993, 
the unemploymenfrate steadily dec!ined to 12.1~  by.tbe end of i 993. In ·1994, the  .  . 
recovery of  agricultural production and exports from the very low 1993 base,' and the · 
gradual strengthenitig of  domestic demand, should result for·the first tinie since '1989 in a ' 
positive, though. moderate, rate of  growth of  GDP.  - . 
VAT increases aimed at contr~lling the budget deficit; combined with (lbov~-average price · 
increases~ have caused'inflation pressures to remain high, At the erid of  December 1993, 
year-on-year inflation stood at 21.1%.  ·  · 
As part of  the SDR 360 million starid-by arrangement.ag~eed with the IMF in September 
1993, fiscal policy is aimed at bringing. down the consolidated state budget deficit from 
7.8% ofGDP in 1992 to 55% in  1994. The  1993,4efi~it target (7% ofGDP) has been 
.  ,  ,  .  I  ,  .  . 
met. 
'  '  . 
. Regardi~g structural reforms, progress has continued to be made in  th~ area of  r 
privatization, the strengthening of  governance in state enterprises, the application of  the  .  · 
1992-bankruptcy law, and the reform' of  the tax and social security sys~ems. Also,· a.new 
· bank consolidation scheme was launched in December 1993.  .  .  . 
'' 
2.  The balance of payments 
Since the third quarter of !'992,'the Hungarian curt~ntaccount has suffered a sharp 
deterioration and is estimated to have reached a deficit of  about US$ 2.7 bn (7.5%of . 
GDP) in 1993 (against a US$ 261.mio surplus· in 1992).This is explained· by four factors  . 
.  · First, domestic demand is experiencing a recovery at a time when Hungary's main-Western 
export  _..markets are suffering from recession or very weak growth  .. Second,. agricultural 
.  prpduction and exports have collapsed as a result of  recent droughts and the 
.·  .disorganization caused by the privatization-or transformation of  state:.owned farms.and  · 
··  cooperatives'. Third, exports have also been negatively effected by the obser-Vance of  the 
UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.'And fourth,·Hungary has suffer~d an 
important loss of  external competitiveness in re~ent years, as reflected in a cumulative 
appreciation ofthe·forint's real exchange rat~.ofaround 35%-(measured with consumer 
prices) since the beginrung of  1990::  · 
The po~r  performance. of  exports since the· third quarter of  1992 has led· the authorities 
since early 1993 to increase the frequency and magnitude of  the forint devaluations within· 
· the "crawling· peg" in order to produce. some realdepreciation of  the currency. With · 
inflation remaining above 20%, however,.-the impact of  this shift in policy on the real 
· exchange rate has so far been very limited.  ·  ·  · 
30 While exports- are expected to grow substantially in 1994, as agricultural production and, 
to a lesser eXtent, foreign demand recover, this will be partly offset by the increase in 
imports as domestic demand accelerates. In this context, the current account deficit is  .  .  .  . 
expected to shrink only moderately in 1994 (to about (5.5% ofGDP). 
D_espite the very high current account deficit, official foreign .exchange reserves expanded 
from US$ 4.4 bn at end-:-1992 to US$ 5.7 bn at the end ofOctober -1993. This was made  _ 
possible by a continuing strorig inflow ofFDI and by the placement by the National Bank 
of  Hungary (NBH), taking advantage of  favourable market conditions, of  about US$  .4. 5 
bn in international bonds in 1993.  · 
3.  Foreign debt· 
The. negative side of  the aggressive international borrowing programme of  the NBH has 
been .a rapid growth of  foreign debt in  1993. Total convertible debt, which had decreased 
by  US$ 0.9 bn in 1992, is estimated to have risen from US$ 21.5 bn at end-1992 to US$ 
24.9 bn at end-1993. The debt/GDP ratio has also deteriorated slightly, reaching an 
estimated 66.3% at the end oflast year: There has been, however, a significant  _ 
improvement in the structure of  the debt, with the proportion ofmedium and long-term 
debt increasing from 89.8%-to 92.8%  .. 
Total debt service amounted to 4.3 bn, practically the same level as in-i 992. However, 
with exports estimated to have fallen by about 20% in 1993, the debt service ratio has 
worsened,. inqeasing from 43.9 to 48:·1 %. Principal repayments are expected to  amount to _ 
around US$ 2.5 bn this year, down from US$ 2.8 bn in 1993; but they are projected to 
rise sharply in-1995 and 1996 to, respectively, US$ 3.4 bn and US$ 3.9 bn. With_the 
current account defiCit expected to remain at relatively high levels in those years, this 
"bunching'i of  amortizations could put considerable pressure on J:Iungary's balance of 
payments. 
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F:  ISRAEL 
'1.  . ·General  economic situation 
GDP increased by 3  .. 5%' only in- 1993, the l~westgrowth  rate since 1989.  The 'closure of  .. 
the Occupied Territoriesin the second quarter slowed down econoffiic activity, but an 
~ iricrea.se wa.s registered tow~ds  the end of  the year; folloWing the peace agreement With  , 
. the  'Pale~ti~ans. 'While growth in the early _90s was driven mainly by inimigrant irillows', 
privatisatiori and deregtilatiori is  now  creating a basis for more sustainable long:term ''  .. 
~rowth. .  ·  · ·  · ·  .·  · 
At the start 6f't993, irillation accelerated sharply from 9% p.a.' end-·1992  to.i6o/~ p.a. in 
the first quarter of 1993.  Consequently, monetary policy was tightened;·  By July,  . 
infiatiomiiy pressures had decreased sufficiently and monetary policy eased again.  At the  ·_. 
end of  199'3;  irlfl~tion had sloweq down to 11.5%-p.a. which is still somewhat above the','' 
initial target of  10~.  ·  - ·  ·  _..  .  '  · · 
2.  The balance of  p·ayments 
'  '  '  0  ' 
F  oreig~ trade was fui"ther liberalised in )993.  with the caJ)celatiori of  a 2% import duty . 
surcharge, a 2% export sl:lbsidy and travel taxes, which con.stituted trade r_estrictions 
under the GATT rules.  Thi5'led to.the effective-unification ofthe exchange rate in July~. 
for the firsi time in Israers history.  In September, Israel accepted the obligations · 
~oncernlng  the free movement of  cu~ent accounttransactions undet: article VIIIof  the-
TMF Articles-of  Agreement~ The CentnllBank oflsrael maintains-a 
1'cra~ling·peg"·  -· 
. exchange_J;ate system with a target depreciation r~te a'nnounced bythe Central Bank, in 
'line with expected irillation, and a 2% variation allowed around. ~he targeted-exchange -
rate. -The announced nite. of  depn~ciation was reduced. in July from :8%. to· 6%, thought to ·  · 
be in line with the slow-down in the inpatio~ rate.  ·  · 
.  .  .  r-
FOIIOWingthe end ofthe Gulf  War, external trade started to pick up again in 1992 an<f this  · 
trend continued:in 1993.  The in~rease in exports~ estimated·at 10%, was·a strong driving-
force. for growth ih 1993.  Tourism also. revived strongly. ·As a result~ the: current account 
deficit were somewhat reduce& from US$1.2 billion in-1992 to US$ 0:9 billion in 1993..· 
Private capital inf]ows, increased as monetary policy  WJlS tightened and int~rest rates ;·.  ;  . 
increased. · Long-term capital irillows also increased following the apprpvaj of  a tiS$ 1  0  -
.billion credit  gtiarimtees packag~  by the ·.us administration.·  ·  · 
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. . ~ 
- '· Officiaf foreign exchange reserves reached a satisfYing level of  US$ 6.2 billion or the 
equivalent of  nearly three months of  imports. 
3.  Foreign debt·· 
The credit guarantees obtained·  from the US government in 1992 have enabled the 
· authorities to  ·draw on mediuni'  and long-term credit lines for investment projects.  Total 
external debt increased to US$ 34.6 billion,.ofwhich nearly three-quarters was public 
"sector debt.  The debt service to exports ratio improved slightly as .export groWth was 
strong in 1993 .. Other debt ratios remained more_ or  _less  stable~ · 
· · At the end.o£'1992, the net externa,J.debt stock stood at US$  15.1 billion and the net 
external debt servi~e amounted to US$ 3 billion.  Net debt and debt service ratios are less·. 
than half of  the gross ratios. 
; 
33 ',  -~ 
' ' 
..  > 
G.  LATVIA 
1.  General economic situation 
FolloWing sev~re outi>Utcgntractions'in1991 (-8.3%) a~d 1992(-33..8%), the Latvian-
economy stabilized in the course.of 1993. For-the year as a whole, ·output contraCtion was 
limited to some 10%, and it is expected that GDP'Will expand. in 1994. ·DUring  1993·~ the 
:official unemployment rate increased from 2.3%to 5.6%  ..  Although this is .more than 
double the unemployment rates of  the other two Baltic countries, it .still leaves. inuch room · 
for adjustment to the lower production ievel compared to the late 1,980s.  · 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
·Last year, .the Latvian authorities succeeded ·in bringing down inflation significantly in line 
With the plan set out in the IMF stand-by ammgement. of  S~ptember 1992. At the ·end of 
1993, the level of  consumer prices w~s  31.3%higher than one year earlier (958.6% in · 
1992). Apart from th~ virtuat completion of price liberalization by the end of 1992, ~his 
was due to the tight stance of  monetaiy policy (since the monetary reform of  July 1992  ), . 
as'well as of  fiscal and incomes policies; However; a substantial capital inflow lnthe . 
cours¢ of 1993 caused a relatively rapid expansion of  reserv-e 'money ..  ··  . 
.During the first three quarters of 1993, the' Latvian budget was in surplus. This was not 
· only due to tight budget control, but ·also to. higher than estimated profit· and value added . 
tax revenues and lower unempioyment benefits. Following the approval of  a 
supplementary budget in October 1993 authorizing inc~eased expenditures for pensions · 
and public sector wages, the budget recorded_ a small deficit. For 1994 a defiCit of 1. 7% of 
· GDP is envisaged.  ·  ·  ··  .  .  · 
In 1993, Latvia also advanced further in a number of  areas of  structural reform. In 
particular, significant progress  was made in_ the area of  banking sector reform. Banking 
:  .. 
.  supervision was also strengthened. In addition,  progr~ss was made in land restitution' and 
privatization of  small-sc~e enterprises. On the other hand~ large-scate privatizatjon d.id not. 
progtess much. This may have been partly  linked to the Parliamentary election in June  . 
. '  ·.  1993 and the subsequent reorganization of  the La~yian Government; in this area  the speed. 
of_refotrn picked up at the end of  the year  ... 
.  ' 
2.  The balance of payments · 
Latvia's current account position was considerably better than expected underlhe first 
~programme  both for 1992 and 1993. The surplus decreased f!om US$ 53 mio in 
1992 to some US$ 40 mio in 1993, ~oinpared to estimated deficits in the order of  US$ 90 
mio arid US$ 240 niio, respectively. To some extent, there may still be a problem of 
underreporting of.imports from the foriner Soviet republics, bunhe situation also reflects 
a betterthan expected performance in the services account. The reorientation of  trade  . 
. tqwards Western markets 'continued in 1993, With exports to the CIS and Baltics declining . 
.  by 45% in volume terms, while expanding another 21% to the rest of  the world. It is likely  . 
that the' strengthening of  domestic demand and th~ gradmilly diminishing comparative  '--
advantage will lead to a deterioration ofthe current account in 1994.  ·  · 
34 
·.I As a consequence of  the strong capit.al inflow in 1993, the Bank of  Latvia accumulated a 
large amount of  reserves (some US$ 360 mio). iricreasing its gross level to some US$ 530 
mio or an equivalent of  4. 7 in months of  total imports (from 1. 8 at the end of  1992). 
' 3. ·  Foreign debt 
La TVA's external debt increased from US$ 53 mio to US$ 504 mio (nearly 14% ofgdp). 
the debt service barely increased from US$ 15  mio in 1992 to.US$ 18 mio in 1993, with 
·  the ratio to exports of  goods and services declining from 2% to 1.%. 
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H •.. LITHUANIA 
1.  General economic situation 
.. In Lithuania, output contraction seems to have-halted at-the end ~f  1993, ~d  the overall 
G:bP decline is estimated at 16% for the whole year, following declines of 13% in l991 
and 3  8% in 1992. The official unemployment 'rate rose. only moqerately in the course of · 
1993 and reached a mere 1.6% atthe end ofl993. Hidden unemploymentis.estirilated at 
· so~e  7%.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
The Lithuanian authorities have reduced inflation 'in I  993, even though less. rapidly than 
the other two Baltic States. The increase in consumer prices which reached.ll63% at the 
end of 199_2'fell to 189o/o·at end-1993. Strict incdm~s and. fiscal policies-throughol!t the 
year, combined with a monetary policy that was tightened in Spring 1993,  c~mtributed  to 
the strong deceleration of  inflation during the Summer.  However~-as the central bank 
intervened in -~he foreign exchange to preyent a strong appreciation of  the litas as a result'  . 
ofcapital infl.ows, monetary expansion picked up and contributed to .a pickup of  inflation 
towards the end of  the year.  ·  · 
_  ·  Th~  Lithuanian authm1ties managed_ to keep public e':(penditures under tight-con!rol in _ 
l993. They also  strengthenedrevenu~sthrough  trad~reforms and. an in<;rease in the 
. general sales tax, such that the budget was broadly in balance, following a deficit in the 
. order of 1% ofGDP in 1992. For 1994~ a deficit of  some 1% ofiGDP is envisaged, ·which 
-the Governmept plans to financ_e through the sale of  treasury bills: 
__ Regarding ~tructural r~foim, Lithuania also continued to progress iri ·a pumber: of  are~s as·· 
foreseen under the IMF stand-by arrangement o(  October 1993.  PrivatiZation advanced 
further; by January 1994, 2/3 of  all  co~panies eligible for privatization (1/J of  all state' 
. -capital) had been privatized through vouchers, public share subscription and attctions.  . 
·-There ~ere also additional price liberalization measure~, including the abolition. of  profit 
margins. Progress in banking reform ~as  relatively slow in 1993. ~md should  speed up in 
1994:-
2.  The balance .of payments  .l 
The currenfacc~un~  'shifted from a surplus ofUS$90 mio in 1992 (originally a defiCitof 
US$ 160 mio had been expected) into· 81) estimated deficit of  about US$ 250 mi~  in 1993 
(S.4%.ofGDP)._· A major factor contributing to this cfeterioration In 1993 was Russia's  · 
move to world market levels for its energy.exports to Lithuania in Fall1992.  The trade 
balance swung_ from a US$ q5 mio surplus to a deficit ofUS$270 mio. The reorientation 
·of  trade continued, in 1993. It is expected ·that the· current account ~ll  deteriorate furth,er 
in 1994to reach a deficit.in the orderofUS$ 400 mio(some S% ofGDP). 
The deterioration of  the current accourit jn 1993 was accompaJli~d-by a  substan~ial ·.· 
· improvement in the capital' accouritfrom a surplus of  US$ 90 mio in 1992 to ·some US$-
.270 mio-in 1993.  Foreign dire'ct investment increased substantially (fro_m US$ 10 mio to 
US$ 40mio), but remained low in comparison.with that ofthe other twoBalticStates, .· 
and Estonia in p"aiticular.  The inflow of  official transfers and medium- and long-te~ · · 
36. 
/  . 
'-. loans roughly tripled to reach in total some US$ 280 mio in 1993.  This capital inflow 
permitted the central bank to accumulate US$ 160 mio in reserves bringing the stock up 
to US$ 280 niio.  In terms of  months of  import~, this signifies however a decrease from 
2.6 in 1992 to 1.8 in 1993, mainly reflecting the rise in imports. 
3.  Foreign debt 
In 1993, Lithuania's external debt stock increased from US$ 99 mio to US$ 345 mio 
(some 11% ofGDP) and the debt service increased from a mere US$ 2 mio in 1992 to · 
US$ IS mio (0.7% exports of  goods and services).  · 
. . 
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I. I •.  ROMANIA 
1.  General economic situation 
~n the course of  1993~ the decline in real GDP has apparently halted .and annual GDP: 
growth is expected to be around zero.  The. declffie inindustrial output luis peen reversed 
in the se.cond half of  1993 and agricultural output has increased substantially. ·In 
December, 9~9% of  the labour force was unemployed, .comp,ared to 8.8% in January  ..  · 
TI:te expected consolidated-government budget deficit for.1993 is in the range of  1-2% of . 
· . GDP.  A fundamental,change in the revenue structure was achieved by the replaeement of· 
·'the turnover tax by a: single-rate VAT in July 1993, which also led. to a better~than~ ·. 
expected outtum of  fiscal revenues.  The abolition ofmost consumer subsidies in May 
· 1993 as well. a~ a restrictive public sector wage indexation policy have restrained . . 
expe11ditures.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
. Most consumer prices had been libera)ised and subsidies elimitlated by May 1993 ..  ·Prices 
.·  of  energy products remain controlled, with frequent adjustments to  keep them broadly in . 
line with border prices.  Inflation ~creased  from about 200% in 1992 to over 300% in· 
1,993 as monetary policy remained weak.  / 
Commercial bank interest rates as well as· NBR (National Bank ofRomania) refinancing · 
rates have remained strongly negative in real terms throughout 1993.  This has led to a 
flight out of  the Leu into foreign currency holdings, as indicated by the growth of  foreign 
.  .  .  (  .  •  l·  .  . 
currency deposits.  ·.  ,  .  ·.  ·  ·  .  ··  .  .  .  .  · 
ID.ter-enterprise arrears··continued t~ accumulate, although at a slower pace.  ·Privatisation 
of  state-oWiled .companies hardly m~de.any  progress, except  for small businesses  · 
pnvittised through management and employee buyouts.  · ·  ·  · 
'  '  '  '  •  '  ,.  '  I  •  •  ,  •  ' 
The econonlic stabilisation and reform programme, agreed upon. with th~IMF, got off-
track in'early 1993.  However, by end 1993, an understanding on a·new stabilization and 
. reform 'j5rogramme had been reached.  I  .-
2.  The balance of  payments 
.  . 
The-l':ffiR has continued to'  m~age  the official rate and multiple exchange rates have  .. 
. persisted throughout 1993.  The. official exchange rate depreeiated trom 433 LeiiuS$ e~d 
1992 to 1360 Lei/US$ end 1993.  As the speed of  depreciation of  the Leu was slowed 
doWn by the NBR during the last quarter of  1993, the gap~betweep the .official and the 
I  eXChange bureaUX
1 exchange rate widened SUbStantially tO ffiOfe than 50% by the end Of 
the year:  A 20% depreciation of  the official rate end December. was riot sufficient to 
. substantially reduce this gap.  .  .  . 
.  .  . 
Imports stabilised around the .1992 level as domestic demand remained weak.  Exports 
registered an increase as' the Interim traqe agreement with the European Community 
· became operational.  As .a  result~ the _current !iCCount deficit slightly ~iminished to  US$ I .3 
38 billio~.  The impact of  the Interim Agreement and the granting of  MFN status on the US 
market will further improve the. current account in  1994. 
Direct foreign investment inflow~ reinain very low as large-scale privatisations· have not 
really started yet.  Although macro.-economic reform programmes were stalled in 1993, 
. medium,and long term official aid inflows c0ntinued at Virtually  the same levels as in 
1992. 
The overall balance of  payments remained positive throughout 1992 and 1993, reflectirig 
an increase in.foreign exchange reserves held by commercial banks while the NBR  fon~ign 
reserves shrank.  They were below US$ 50 million by end 1993, equivalent to 3 days of 
imports, while commercial banks held some US$ 1 billion in foreign asset~. 
3.  Foreign debt 
·Total external debt increased rapidly from Virtually zero in 1989 to over US$ 5.8 billion or 
22% ofGDP end 1993 and debt service accounted for 16.7% of  export revenues.  As 
foreign investment inflows are unlikely to increase rapidly, official medium and long term .. 
loans will remain the principal source of  finance for the current account deficit and, 
consequently, the growth of  the debt stock is projected to continue. 
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J.  RUSSIA,  . 
,,  1.  ~Generaf  economic situati~n ' 
Russia's economic performance has been particularly disappointing iri  199~ and l9~H. The 
fall ofout'put (-19% in 1992)was still pronounced iri 1993 (-12%). Investment has fallen  ·  . 
.  .  to no· more than half of  its 1989level. Financfal policies have been loose for most of  the 
period and inflation has remained very high - 20-25% per morith. Living Standards have 
' . declined markedly. Also, progress with putting in place the  _legislative. and instifutionai. 
' . _·  frameworkfor a  market econdmy hasbeen, patchy, and structural reform slow in most 
. respects. A bankruptcy law came into force hi March 1993, but  has not begun to be .. 
implemented," as was the case with. many other key  measures~  However~ a large share of· . 
small enterpris~s has been privatized and a mass privatization programme was developed, 
under which close to half of  large enterprises had been privatized by the end of  1993". -Iri  · 
·.  October 1993, a decree· was issued allowing forthe first time the privatization pfland  .. · 
.  - .  .  .  .  . 
.  ~. 
In May 1993, agreement was reached between the goveriunent and t~e Central-Bank to . 
. reduce creQ!t expansion, increase. interest rates ~d  limit the budget deficit. The measures 
implemented in the following months brought down inoneysupply growth; which helped ' 
to reduce monthly inflation to 13% in December  .. The steep fall of  the exchange rate was. 
arrested. Progress in stabilization allowed the lMl' to agree on 1 Ju!y on the disbursement 
of  the fir-st halfofa:$3 billion 'loan under its new Systemic Transformation Facility. 
Hqwever, as the ·curbs on govef11II1ent spending were often achieved by deferrals rather 
'  than by cuts, arenewed inflationary impulse was e~pected in early 1994  .  .J ariuary 1994 ' 
-inflation was-22~, anp. the exch~ge·  rate of  the rouple, tp-at hadremaiJ).ed fairly siable  -.  . 
· since t~e end of September, went dowt1fr6m.around 1250 roubles per dollar·to· over 1600 
roubles since the beginning ·of 1994.  ·  ·  ·  · 
· .  A,s a r~sult of  the strong showing of  nationalist and conservati~e forces in December 1993 
elect_ions, economic policy loo!s set to give ~ess attention t()  macro~cononiic stabilizll,tiori; .. 
·but rather to safegUarding incomes, employmeiit,and production, with a great~r.use·ofthe 
instruments of  direct government control.  ·  ··  ·  · 
2.  . The bal~nce ofpayinents.-
.  .  .  - . 
.  ·Russia's external situatio~ worsened substantially in 1992 and  1993~  ~eflecting the-impact: 
of  the systemic. changes, the  disruptions of  traditional trade and p&yments arrangements ' 
. - and domestic macroeconomic policies: However, d':Jring this period Ru~sia's gross foreigrl' 
exchange reserves incr~ased to close to $4.5 b!llion (they were-virtually nil two years -
-~~  '  -
· In 1992, official balance of  payments support from the West (bilaieral trade credits and  . 
grants: and.credit from the IMP of$1 billion under the'  first  ~redif  tranche arrangement). 
approached $17 billion. However; oWing to a  weaker export peiformance,  ·a bunching of 
· debt servicing obligations and large recorded or unrecorded capital flight (  estimat~d to · 
soine $10 billion),  thi~ did not prevent either a sharp reduction of  imports or a dramatic · 
increase in debt arrears. In 1993, imports appear to have been further reduced and the 
'  .  .  .  .  .  .,  ..... 
.40 trade surplus is likely to have widened substantially, maybe to over $10 billion; also, the 
capital outflows were quite ·significant - certainly la~ger than new financing. This is due, at 
- least in part, to lower,Ievels of  official exterrial financing (around $9 billion) and not  · 
sufficiently strong domestic financial policies.  -
3.  ·  Foreign debf 
At the end of 1992, total foreign debt of  the former Soviet Union approached $,78 billion, 
up from $67 billion a year later. It was over$80 billion at the end of  1993_. More tha.Q half 
of  the debt is owed to official creditors. The debt remains, however, relatively modest in 
view of  the size ofthe economy (some 60% ofGDP at the end of  1993r In 1993, total 
·scheduled_ debt servicing ($19 billion) represented almost 50% of  exports.  · 
In December 1991-January 1992, the official and private creditors of  the former Soviet 
-Union agreed with the. former republics on a deferral of  some $7.1 billion (principal 
repayment obligations on credits extended to the USSR before 1991). The deferral 
proved, however, insufficient since Russia, the only former Soviet republic to have made 
any debt servicing in 1992 (the pa~ents  were supposed to be made by all the NIS made 
jointly and severally responsible for the debt), was unable to meet the still substantial 
obligations. Russia's debt payments in 1992 amounted to only $1.6 billion. As a result,· 
-arrears increased dramatically; at the en~ of 1992, they approached $17 billion. 
In early April 1993, a generous debt rescheduling agreement was reached with the Paris 
Club that reduced the offici~d debt servicing in 1993 by some $15·billion. The agreement 
was this time concluded with Russia alone, making it the sole actual manager of  the ex-
'Soviet debt: The agreement goes well beyond the deferrals agreed earlier and the standard 
creditors' practice. It was granted before a fully fledged IMF programme was put in place; 
·it covers credits extended-in 1991, i.e. after the cut-off date agreed previously; it  proVides 
for a medium-term deferral of  part of  moratorium interest. The creditors have recently 
decided to prol<;>ng the validity of  the 1993 agreement until the end of  April·I994, but 
further negotiations may prove difficult in the ab~ence of  an IMF prow::amme., 
Also, in July 1993, Russia reached-an agreement in principle with the commercial banks 
on a long~term rescheduling of  the_ ex-Soviet commercial debt ($24-26 billion is owed to 
some 600 banks). In parallel with progress in the negotiations with the commercial 
creditors, the priceofthe Russian debt on the secondary market that had. been below 20% 
_at the beginning of 1993, rose gradually to some 55% by early December. Subsequent 
delays in the final agreement due to .unsettled legal issues and Russia's failure to make the 
payment of  part of  interest arrears due in 1993 ($450 million) have, however, led to a new 
fall ofthe price- to 35%  .. 
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K~  OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 
'  '  . 
-1.  General economic situation 
.  . 
• .-The situation in the other Newly Independent States varies  considerably~ All  the. forriler 
- republics have suffered in 1992-1993 from the weakening of  old structures which have not . 
· yet beeri replaced by market-oriented institutions and the collapse of  inter-republican trade 
·1i~s. The decline in trade among the former republics (20-30% in ·1992,  probably_ of·a 
similar magnitude in 1993) has had serious knock.:on effects on output. Output deClines-in 
1992 -rariged  from  around  10%  in Belarqs  and  Uzbekistan,  to  40%  in -Georgia  and 
Armenia. Declines in activity continued in 1993  (betWeen  7% in  Moldov~  .  and 25% in 
Tajikistan),  but  'two  countries  (Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan) · reported  increased 
aggregate output in  1993. Loose fi~ancial policies in inany_ NIS compounded the adverse· 
effects of  the external shocks. Inflation-remained very high throughout the area.  ~n 1992, 
it  varied_from around 6 times (in Azerbaijan) and over.l6 times (m Ukraine).  In  1993, 
inflation  accelerated  markedly  in  a  number  of NIS,  and. several. new  states  (Armenicl, 
Georgia, Ukraine) are clearly in hyperinflation.  .  . .  ,  . 
· . Far-reaching economic reform has begun in  mosL NIS,  and  sotpe of them ilave already·· 
rp.ade. considerable ·strides in the transition to market-based  system while  implementing . 
. stricter financial  policies~ Kyrgyzstan,· Moldova,  Kazakhstan and :ijelarus have received 
·  financial support .  from the IMF (the first  three,-in· the form of stand-by arrangements). 
Other States have yet done little to change th'e  inherited economic· stnict1.lres.  Some are 
· hardly· in  a  situation  whicp  allows  th~m  :to  contemplate  systemic  reform:  Armenia  is _ 
· suffering a blockade, Tajikistan and Georgia are devastated by civil war or ethnic unrest. 
<  '  •'  '  •  •  L 
· 2.  The balance of  payments 
· The  balance of payments ·,situation  of the area i.'s  extre~ely' w_eak,  with  probably  the  .· 
exception of Turkmenistan.  Large trade deficits with Russia,  linked  primarily to higher 
prices  for  energy  and  raw  materials  imports· from  Russia,  make · the  current  account 
-position of number of  the new  s~ates hardly sustainable.  '{he financial credibility of most  · 
NIS is further aggravated by lack of  international reserves.  ·  ·  -
In a longer term perspeCtive, the new states present· rather variable prospects·~- Some have 
coqsiderable  hard  currency  earning  potential  (K~akhstan,  ·Uzbekistan)  and  industrial 
capacity.  Others are  Clearly  close. to. developing  countries  and. will  therefore  strongly 
depend on external assistance.  Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have already been made eligible 
_ to highly concess!onal IDA  lending.  ·  · 
_  .  3~  Foreign debt_ 
.In i 993,·the NIS have achieved substantial progress in clarifying their position vis-a-vis 
.  . the question of  tlte roreign deb! of  the formei' SoViet Union. Initially (at the end of 1_991), 
·  - ·the former republic~ were made jointly and severally responsible for such debt. The 
Memorandum ofUndefstanding setting forth the principle-ofjoint and several ·  ' 
.  responsibility was signed on 28 October 1991. The April-1993 Paris Club agreement-With 
··Russia was accompanied by a change inlegal arrangements on debt servicing withiqthe · 
FSU making in fact Russia the sole actual manager of  ,the debt. Accordingly, the creditors 
· acknowl~dged  thaHheso~called "zero-option" agreements concluded by Russia with  . 
:other former republics (by virtue of  which Russia takes over the full amount of  the ex-
. Soviet debt, in exchange for the full amount of  the ex-Soviet ext~rnal assets) discharge 
them o(  any servicing of  such debt. Already in .1992,  Rus~ia had  .concluded full  zerq~ · 
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., option agreements with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan; Turkmenistan and Uzbeldstan; it had also 
signed temporary protocols with several other NIS. More recently similar agreements .. 
were concluded with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 
/ 
'-
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t.THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
· 1.  ·Gen·eral economic situation ·_ 
SloV.ak real GDP is estimated to have declin~d  by 5-1% in 1993,implyit_lg a fourth  . 
· _ consecutive_ yearofrecession, and is:expected to show at best zero gl-owth in.1994. 'The- . 
.  · unemplqYirtent rate reached 14.4% at end-1993.  . . : · .  ·  · 
. Th~  split of the CSFRhas disrupted· trade with the Czech Republic and'has obliged the.  -
Slovak  authorities to  -pursue restrictive macro-economic' policies. Monetary policfhad to 
be. very tight·in the first half of 1993 in order to. defend the country's r~serves amid 
speculation a~out a devruuation ofthe Slovak  .cr<~wil  ..  While· the monetary stance was  . · 
·-_gradually eased'after-the July devaluation, th~  re~mergeirce of  pressures on.the-exchange~:. 
· · niie at the end of  1993 obliged the National Bank of  Slovakia (NBS) to raise_ the  dis~:ount  · 
rate on December 21. On the fiscal front, the authorities have made a.· significant effort to/ 
contiol:the budget deficit after'  the termination of  the fiscal transfers from the Czech lands, 
in spite ofwhich the g€meral'governm~nt is estilnatedto have run a deficit ofkbout 7% ~f 
~~~- - . 
IQcreas~s in indirect  taxation ~d  the 100/o'devaiuationofthe Slovak  crown i1;1 July :1993 
have resulted in an increase ip CPI inflation from 12.7% at end-1992 to 25~  1% at end-
·.1993._. 
/ 
With.the first wave.oflarge~scah:i privatization having been completedlast spring, the  · .. 
s'lovak government is now preparing a second wave that will primanly rely. on traditional 
.  privatization :t)lethods, such asdiiect sates to foreign investors arid tenders. Coupon. 
privatization will still be used butin airiu~:h smaller scale than.before  ..  -
..  .  ~. - .  ·- - ·.  - .  '  ~ 
. 2.  The balance of payments 
. ·. The  l~ss ofthe  fis~al tnmsfers froni ~he Czech Republic :was expected toe unmask a large . 
deficit inthe Slovak  current account. In the event, however, the sharp compression of·  ._ 
·domestic demand and imports and the devaluation of  the Slovak croWn have avoided tlie 
emergence of  a 1 $erious deficit. Thus, excluding j:ransfers from the  Czech Republic . 
-associated with' the distribution of  voucher  ~shafes  >to· Slovak citizens, NBS data show a 
total cu~ent account deficitof'l.TS$ 289 mio:(or 2.9% ofGDP) in the firstJO months of · · 
1993. 
·,  .  ~ 
· Slovakia is; however, .having problems to finance  e~en  this smaller-than-expected account 
·  ..  deficit. At an estimated US$ 100 mio in-1993, net FDI continues-to be oflittle· · ·  · 
significance. Furthermore, Slovalcia lacks  good  access. to the internatiorial capital_markets, 
p(lrtly because, ul'llike the Czech Republic,  .. Slovakia can no longer benefit from the solid 
·  ·  · internation31 ee;onomic reputation. that the federal goveinment  ·had built since the-
begimling·ofthe reforms  .. Slovak borrowers I:ia"e phiced only two international bonds 
·'since the break-up·ofthe CSFR. Finally, speculation about a devaluation of  the Slovak 
-crown. has .resulted both in the first half of 1993 and since the end of  that year in a 
sig~ficant  otitfl~w of  short~term capital·  .  .·  ·.  ·.  . · 
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~.,  o  F ·To help ease its balance.ofpayments constraint, the IMF granted to. Slovakia an SDR 
64,3 5 mio (US$ 89-mio)-Systeffiic Transformation Facility (STI;') loan in July 1993. The  __ 
-IMF is also-about to .reach agreement ~th  the Slovak authorities on an econpmic pQlicy  -.. 
-progamme 'that could be supported in the coming months by a stand-by arrangement  and~ 
_  possibly, a. second purchase from the STF. In 8:ddition, the World Bank approved in-
. November 1993 a US$ SO mio Economic Recovery Loan.  .  "  .  .  . '  ~·  .. 
The weakness of  Slovakia's balance of  payments has been reflected-in a very ~lnerable 
foreigri exchange reserves position. Capital flight in early 1993 practically depleted official 
-hard-currency reserves. This led-the authorities to introduce temporary restrictions in  ~ 
February;. While official reserves recovered betwe~n  May and September, the NBS has 
again been losing reserves in recent months. Official foreign exchange _reserves stpod at 
- only US$ 343 mio (two weeks ofimports} at the end ofJanuary.l994.  -
.  I  .  .  .  '  .  . 
The bcilance of  payments is expected to strengthen· somewhat but remain wea~  in 1994.  ·  · 
.  Depressed economic activity, the introduction of  a 10% import ·surcharge ori consumer · 
goods in early March and, perhaps, a_ new devaluation of  the currency could result in some 
reduction in the current account 9eficit.  The capital account is also likely to improve,--
· supported by substantial officiai financial assistance and by a reversal of  capital flight once 
the exchange rate situation is clarified.  This would b_e consistent with an increase in  -_ 
official reserves in' 1994. 
0~  top of  the 10% devaluation of  the Sloyak crown against convertible currencies,. 
decided last July in the contexto(the· adjustment programme agreed with the IMF, the . 
curre_p_cy lias been devalued by 5%againstthe clearing ecu.  --
3.  Foreign debt 
Despite la:&t year's ·sigruficant. gro~h  of  foreign debt, Slovakia-continues to show ~ 
relatively low foreign debt burden. Total convertible debt is estimated to have increas~d -· 
from US$ 2._6 bn at end-1992 to US$ 2.8 bn at end-1993, a level which still implie~ 
relatively comfortable debt/GDP and debt/export ratios of, respectively; 28 and 42% -
Slovakia remains curn.~~t in aU its debt service obligations. Total debt service is estimated·: 
to have amounted to US$ 670 mi~  in -1993, practically unchanged ·from 1992. While· the  -
decline in exports has resulted in some deterioration in the debt service ratio, such a ratio 
is still at a reasonabhdevel (1 0%). Principal repayments, however, are projected to 
~ncr~ase considerably in the coming years, putting some additionill pressure on  'the balance 
of  payments.  · 
'll1ese restrictions were removed in December 1'993. 
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The lnstitutiotial Investor (2}. 
Position in the ranking (4) · 
(number of cOuntrieS)·  ·  ,-·•, 
Cr~it rating (5) 
. '· 
..  .. 
6_9 
51-
1.8' 
1 4 
0.9 
0.5• 
25 4> 
'46.8 
9 5: 
No! 
.  No' 
.ss;.. 
..  (41'92--.!,'93) 
on-trac~ but 
,  _  exp~rec ,.,.,th · 
diSSOic.~tOn 
ofCS~R 
Ba1 
!· 
Not·raled 
3\) 
·s 
49 
(169) 
Mar -·Sep 
.37  39 
I  (119)(125) 
471  46.1 
1.-
i 
9  .. 0 
6.8 
2.2· 
1.5 
- 0.9 
. 0.6  ·. 
28 7 
55.3 
8.9 
. No 
No 
.SBA 
(  31'93-31'94) 
On-track 
Baa3  _ 
BBB 
.25 
~ 
Mar- Sep 
48 .  43-
(169).(170) 
Mar: Sep 
42  . 40 
(127) (133i 
44.6.46.6 
-(1). For sOme data, preliminai}- ~stimates.  .  .  . 
·  (2)  For 1992. rating 0r position in the-ranking as~igned  to the former CSFR.  - .  .  . ,  . 
(3)  Countries are giv4im a rating between A. E and a ·Score betWeen' 1'- 100, with E. and 100-represe[lting 
the highest risk_  ·  - ·  ..  .  ·  .  .  . 
(4) ·The higher the score in the. ranking, the loWer the creditworthiness-ofthe country.  . 
(5)  Countries are rated on a scale of  zerp to 100. with 1  00 representing the_. leasi  chance of defau~ ·A giVen country . 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rat_ing for an rated_countries im~roves 
.  1 11-F-3 
Last update: 
28102/94 
Country Risk indicators 
. Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial production ( % change) 
·Unemployment rate (end of penodL 
Countr'y:  ·.Estonia 
lnJiation rate (Dec/De<;) 
Exchange rate (Kroons per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(change. Dec/Dec)  ·· 
(chsnge.  Q41Q4)  {- ='Depreciation) 
'  (chen~. Q41Q4)  (-~depreciation) 
General government balance (as •;. o'f GDP) 
Balance of payr11ents 
ExportS of goods (in mio USD) 
Current account balance (in% of GDF;') 
Net inflow of foreign dorect investment (in moo  USD) 
_.Official FX reserves (end of penod) 
1n  mio USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
f---------..-"-~----,----------------·--;-----~------.-----
External debt 
Extemaf.debt -
(in convertible currencies. in bn USD. end ot penod) 
medium and long-term (?'  1 year)  · 
short-term(=< 1 year)  ·  .· 
·'Convertible debt service (in moo  USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debt/GOP(%) 
·External debt/exports 'of G&S (%) 
Oeqt service/exports of G&S (%) 
.. Arrears (on both'interest and principal. in m•o USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
,• 
' 
'i 
·; 
' 
1992 
I 
-2301 
-38 71 
20' 
9535 
n.a. 
·n.a. 
n.a. 
: 1' 
I 
6Soi 
891 
(?9!' 
i 
195.1: 
. 36: 
1993 (J) 
-5.0 
-35 2 
'1.7 
35.7 
8.2 
n.a 
n.a. 
.O.Q 
1000' 
-1 7 
86 4 
. - ---- "------------; 
'I 
.I 
:. 38.1  .I 
n·.a [ 
2g:l·· 
n.a. 
n aj. 
3.61 
59! 
321 
No!  . 
Noj· 
168.3 
n.a. 
n a. 
208 
n.a. 
n.a. 
97 
16.8 
2.1 
No 
No. 
" 
' 
1--~-------,-~--~--'-------------------------;---.  .  .. __ -- . ~-----''-..,--~----4 
IMF arrangements 
Typeino 
(Date I- ) 
On track/off track 
( -/Date) 
-~--~ 
SBA.  SBAJSTF 
(9'92-9193)  :(10193-l/94) 
:..'ri  track  ,  On track 
----- ·-------
l  --t'  '  ~ 
i  Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
(1) 
(2) 
{3) 
(4) 
. Moody's long-term foreign-currency rating (end of penod) 
S&P long-term foreogn currency ratJng (end of  'period) 
. EIU country risk service (2) 
..  Score (end of period)  · 
Rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
PositiOn in 1t1e ranking (3) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (3) 
(number.of countries) 
Credit rating (  4 ). 
' 
I 
I 
Not rated 
I 
Not rated 
Not rated  .Not rated 
I 
> 
BO  ·75 
E  D 
Mar  Sep 
117  126  122 
(169)  (169) (170) 
Mar . Sep  Mar  Sep 
68  74  81  84 
(119).(126)  (.127)  (1~3) 
25.7  22.1  21.4  2o.9 
For SO!Tle data, preliminary estimates. 
Countries are given a .rating between A - E and a· score between 1 - 100, with E and 100 representing · 
the highest risk.  . 
The higher the score in the ranking, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
Countries are rated on a. scale of zero to. 100. with 100 representing 1t1e least chance of default. A given country. 
m~y  improve its rating.and still fall in the· ranking if also the average glob~! rating for all rated COIJntri~ improves  .. 
...-....  .  .  '  '  ;  .- .  ' ·. 
11-F-3 
_,  ,last update: 
28102/94 
,Real GOP grov-1h rate (in %) 
Industrial production ( %change) 
Country Risk indicators · 
Country:  Hungary 
Unemployment (%of iabour force) (end of period) 
Inflation rate 
Exchange rate (forints per USD) · 
·Nominal effeictive exchange. rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(change. Dec/Dec) 
(change. 04104)  (- =  deprectal10n) 
(change. 0.4104)  (- =  depre_cialton) 
Gener~l government,balance (as% of GOP) (GDS definitio-n) 
,. 
_-, 
.1991  i.  1992  '1993 (1) 
r------------------------------------------------------------r---------:·---_-----------------~ 
Balance of, payments 
Merchandise exports (in mio USD) 
Current account bcilance (in %-of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct i-nvestment (in mio USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period) 
.  in  bn USD  . 
. in months of imports of merchandjses 
i 
! 
.j 
;  '  ' 
9258: 
0.8 
1474 . 
4 0 
53 
i ()()28  8184 
0.8  -6.1 
-1471  1200 
.-
4 4;  (Oct)  57 
6 1!  (Oct)  69 
r-~----,-----,------'---.--------------- ------~----- ----.  _. --,--------_-----~----'  --.  ---------
External debt 
· Ex1emal debt 
(in con11erltble  cur~enc1es. m bn USD. end of penod) 
medium and long-term(> 1 _year)  · 
short-term(=< 1 year)  ~ 
Convertible debt service (in bn USD) _ 
principal ;  --
interest 
Ex1_emal debt/GOP(%)' 
Ex1emal debt/ mercpandi_se ex~rt:s (%) 
Debt service/ merchandise exports(%) 
Arrears (6n both interest and principal: in mio USD) 
Debt relie~ agreements and rescheduling 
' 
' 
22 4 
20 2 
2.2 
4(f. 
2.4 
1 6 
72 5: 
242.0; 
43  2 
No 
No 
'  . ! 
21  5 j  24 9 
; 
19:3  23 1 
2.3  1.8 
'4.4  4.3 
2.8  2.7 
1 6  1.6 
65.5  66.3 
214.4  278.8 
43.9  481 
No  No 
No  No 
----------- ------ --------- .. -------- ------ __ ; _____________  _:____ 
IMf_arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-·) 
On trackloff track 
( -I Date)_· 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's lorig-term foreign currency rating·(end of period)_ 
Sll.P long-tem1 foreign currency rating (end of period) 
EIU country risk service (2)  · 
'  Score (end.o~ period) 
Rating (end of period) 
Eurornoney 
Position in the ranking (3) 
(number of C:ountries) 
The  Jnstjtutionaf Investor 
Position in the ranking (3) 
(number of countries) 
Creditrating (4) 
i 
! 
I 
EFF 
(2/91-2/94) 
On track 
Ba1  · 
Not rated 
n.a 
n.a.  ' 
'  . EFF 
Off track 
·Summer 
--. 
.. 
Ba.1 
BB• 
40 
B 
I  44  I  46 
I 
(130)  i  '(169) 
Mar  Sep  I  Mar  Sep 
.  41  42  ! . 42  43 
1(-111) (113):(119) (12~) 
,4_11  40.9,41.7  42.3 
; 
1 
·, 
I 
I 
i 
; 
[ 
i 
I 
; 
!  I 
(1)  For some data,-prefiminary estimates.  .  .  . 
(;2)  Countries are given<! rating between A -·E and a  scare between 1 - 100, withE and-100 representing 
the highest risk.  ·  .  .  - .  .  -. ·  ·  " 
(3)  The higher the score in the ranking, the lo.;...er the creditworthiness of the_ country. 
SBA~ 
(9/93-12/94) 
On track 
-
Ba1 
BB+ 
50 
c 
Mar  Sep 
47  46 
(169) (170) 
.Mar  Sep 
43  :'43 
(127) (133) 
44.3  44.8 
(  4)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 1  00, with 100 representing· the least chance of  ·default. A given country 
may improve Its rating and still fall in the r~anking if also the aver~ge global ratin!;? for all rated countries. improves. .! 
11-F-3 
Last updace· 
01f03194. 
Real GOP growth rate (in %) 
lndustrial·jJroduction (%change) 
Unemployment rate (average) 
lnnalion rate 
Exchange rate (shehels per USD) 
Nominal eHective exchange rate 
Real eHective exchange rate  · 
(1990'=100)  . ' 
Country Risk indicators 
Country:  l&rael 
(OeciDec) 
(change, decloec) 
(change. 04104)  (· = depreciation) 
(change, 04104)  (- =  depreciation) 
i 
1991  , ..  1992  i 
5.91  6.51 
80 i.  10.01  ' 
10.61  1121 
.  i  ' 
1993 (1) 
3.5 
9.3 
9.0 
I 
180 i 
11.51' 
-9.4 
.  ! 
9.01  11.5 
3.61 
I 
21.1  1  s.s 
-9.31 (03103)  -3.1 
. -4.51.(03103)  2.5 
I 
! 
I 
f<;eneral government balance (as % of GOP)  5.9 
~--·-'----! 
-4.91 
' 
-3.2 
~------·--------------------------------~~~·----~.~----r-------
Balance of payments  - i  : 
i  i 
Exports (on  bn USO) 
Current account balance (in % of GOP) • 
Net innow of foreign direct investment (it:~ mio USO) 
Off  !Coal  FX reserves (end ol period) 
in  bn USD 
on  months ol imports of G&S 
12.2:. 
.() 31 
.-161  1 
6.3' 
3.4: 
I 
13.31 
·1  2"' 
-340' 
51 
2.5 
1--------------------------------------·---'-------- . 
External debt 
External debt 
(in convertible currencies. in bn USD. end of period) 
medium and long-term (> 1 year) 
short-term (=< 1 year) 
Convertoble debt service (in bn USO) 
principal 
onterest 
External debVGOP ("4) 
External debVexports ("4) 
Debt seiVlce/exports ("4) 
Arrears (on both interest and pri!:'cipal, in moo  USO) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
33.oi 
! 
n.a.1 
n.a.• 
7.0: 
n.a. 
n.a 
56.9, 
170.0. 
57.4: 
No· 
No; 
33 9j 
n a. 
n a 
63 
n a.: 
~-a: 
·53 3' 
155.0: 
47 4. 
No, 
No: 
n.a 
6.2 
2.9 
·----
34.6 
n.a 
n.a 
6.5 
n:a 
n.a 
54 
135.0 
.44 2 
No 
No 
~---------~-----------------------------------------------~------~----------------------~ 
IMF arrangements 
Typelno 
(Date f.) 
On tracl\/off track 
(-/.Date) 
<. 
•(  No·  CCFF 
. (3192-3193) 
On-track 
------------------ ·---------------·--- ---·- - ..  -
Indicators ol market's perceived creditworthiness 
. Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of penod) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
EIU countr)r nsk service (2)  · 
Score (end of period) 
Rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Posrtoon in the ranking (3) 
(number of countries) 
· The Institutional Investor 
Positoon in the ranking (3) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rat.! no ( 4) 
-(1)  For some data. preliminary estimates. 
'  Not rated  ' 
Not rated 
BBB- BBB-
; 
Not rated  Not rated 
! 
I 
Not rated  :  Not rated  i  I 
'  !  i 
;  38  32  I 
(13Q)  I  {169)  > 
-j  Mar  Sep  i Mar  Sep  j· 
i  s,  s,  1  so  s2  I 
1
(111) (113)\(119) (126) 
34.9  35.2137 ,  35.1 I 
:  .  I 
(2)  Countries are given a rating between A- E and a score between 1 ·  100, withE and 100 representong 
the highest risk.  · 
(3)  The higher the score in the ranking, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
No 
Not rated 
.BBB• 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar  Sep 
2g  29 
(169) (170) 
Mar-Sep 
46  46 
(127) (133) 
39.6  40.5 
(4)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of defau~. A g1ven country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average glob.;ll rating for all rated countries improves 11-1--3 
Last update: 
28102194 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial produdion (·%change) 
' Unemployment (end o(period) ·  . 
Country Risk indicators 
Country: 
1----------.~-~----------~--~---~,------------~--~~~--~-
Inflation rate (OecJI)eci 
Exchange rate (Lats per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate · 
Real eff~ive  exchange rate 
., 
(ch~nge,  ·oec!Dec) 
(change, 04104)  (- =  deprec1at1on) 
(change, 04104)  (- =  depre'c1ation) . · 
-General government balance (as %'of GOP) 
-· 
--
' 
-
1992  ! 
1993(1) 
,_ 
I 
-33.81  -10.0 
.. -35.11  -38.0 
·.  _·.  2.3  5.6 
I 
,. 
9-~~1 
31.3 
n.a. 
nal  n.a. 
nal.  _n.a: 
I 
ool  ..  -0.4 
! 
------------~--~~~------~----~--~----~-----------·------~~-~---~--------1 
·- .  '  i  Balance_of payments 
EXports  (in mio USD)  · 
·Current account bala~  (in %of GOP)  , . 
Net in  now of foreign direct 1n..Testment (in mio USO) 
Official FX reserves.(endof period)  ·  · 
in  mio USO 
- in months of lrriports of G&S 
'I 
External debt 
(in convertible cu_rrencies. m m10 USO.end of  penod) 
medium and long-term(> 1 year) 
short-term(=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (in mio USD)  · · 
P~0Cipal  · 
.interest 
External 'debt/GOP (%) 
Exte·mal debt/merchandise exports(%) 
Debt service/merchandise exports(%)  - -. 
Arrears (on both·interest and principal. iri m1o USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling ·  , . 
l----:-___c_------,----------'---;-'---c----.,-.,--'-c--- __ _c__:  _____ _c_' ___  _ 
IMF arrangem.ents 
Type/no 
(Date·/-) 
On track/off track 
(-/'Date)· 
.. I 
831 i 
401 
43! 
)56!. 
1 a: 
53: 
n  a.i 
n a; 
15 1! 
n aj 
n al 
4 Oi 
7 Oi 
2 o: 
Noi 
Noi 
I 
;. 
~ 
., 
·-
522 
4.7 
504 
n.a. 
.n.a. 
18.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
14.0 
28.0 
1.0 
No 
No 
SBA  SBNSTF 
1  o  -;~r:J]-9!9))  ~  (12/9)-)/95) 
On track  :on track (:2) 
~--~~---,-'------~-------------,------·  -----------,----------------------- . ---------------------c-1 
Indicator~ ol market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreigri currency rating (end of penod) 
S&P long-term fOI"eign currency rating (end o(period). 
EIU country risk service (3)  ·, 
_Score (end of period) 
· Rating (end of period). 
Euromoney 
Position in the.ranking (4)' 
·(number of countries)· 
" 
0 
·Not rated.  i  Not rated' 
Not rated  : Not rated 
80  75 
E- D 
.' 
Mar  Sep 
123  133  132 
(1 69)  (169) (1 70) 
The Institutional Investor  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep  ·  . 
i  72  77  89  87  . 
i(1 19),(126)  (127) (133) 
'  : 23.9  21_.4  19.5  20.0 
. Position in the ranking (  4) 
(number of countries) 
Credit' rating (5) 
l1)  For some data, preliminary estimates.  .  _ 
(2)  Following the review of  fourt~ quarter 1993 performance ~rite  ria, it was decided that Latvia could not purchase the 
relevant tranche fOI" failure of observing the criterion on reserve money. Next review' expeded for Aprii 199·4. 
(3)  Countries are given a rating between A - E anCI a scare between 1 - 1 oo: Wrth  E a~d 100 representing 
the highest risk.  .  .  _  . _  . 
(  4)  :!'he higher the score in the ranking ,lf1e·lower the ~reditworthiness ()f the country.  ,  . 
(5)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero-to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of  defau~. Agiven·country 
may improve its· rating and still fall in the ranking.if also the ·average global rating for all rated  cou~tries improves. 
\, \. 
U-F-3 
Last update: 
26102194 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Industrial production ( %change) 
.Unemployment rate (eOd of period) 
Inflation rate (Dec/Dec) 
Exchange rate (Utas per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange' rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
Country Risk indicators 
Country:  Lithuania 
(change, Qec/Dec) 
(change. 04104)  (- = deprectalton) 
(change, 04104)  (- =  depreciatton) 
General government balance (as_% of GOP) 
t--:--~---,--------'----~------------·--- . -·· 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S (in mio USC)) 
Current account balance (tn% of GOP) 
Net inflow of foreign direct investment (in mto USD) 
Offteial FX re'Serves (end of period) 
in  mto USD 
in monltls of imports of G&S 
-------------------------·-----------------
External debt 
EX1emal debt 
(m  convertible currencies  ..  m bn USO.  end of penod) 
medium and long-term(> 1 year) 
short-term(=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (1n mio USD) 
principal 
interest 
. EX1emal debVGDP (%) 
EX1emal debVexports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both interest and princ1pal.  tn  m1o  USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
t---------------·.-·--------·-·-· -----
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
On trackloff track 
(-/Date) 
( 
1992  i 
1993 (1 ). 
'  '  '  I 
-37J I  -16.2 
-51.61  -42.7 
. 1 o I  1.6 
i 
! 
1162.51  188.6 
n a.j  n.a 
n a!  n.a 
! 
n.aj  n.a. 
: 
'  i 
I 
\  0 9!  -01 
; 
- ~---------.  -------
999' 
5 51 
10; 
1:.:0 
2.6 
; 
1694 
-8.4 
40 
-----·- ----·---~---
(  _., 
98 8  j  .345.3 
n a:;  n.a 
n.a:j  l".a 
2 o I  15.0 
I 
n  a.J  n.a. 
n_.a.;  n.a  . 
5,4 i  1  1.,2 
7 8!  16.3 
0 21  0.7 
Noi  No 
No!  1\io 
·---------· --------
SBA  SBA/STF 
(10192-9193)  : (10193-3194) 
On track  ,  On track 
._ ______________________________________  ....  --·  ------'-------
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rat1ng (end of period) 
EIU country risk service (2) 
Seore (end of period) 
Rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (  3) 
(number of countries) 
The Institutional Investor 
Position in the ranking (3) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (  4) 
i 
; 
Not rated 
Not rated 
80 
E 
i 
' 
i 
Not rated 
!:-Jot rated 
! 
I  75 
I  D 
1  Mar  Sep' 
.
1 
118  134  130 
(169}  . (169) (170) 
Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
1·  73  80  91  93 
!<119) (126j!(127) (1;33) 
123.7  20.7  18.9  19.0. 
!  I 
. (1)  For some data, preliminary estimates. 
(2)  Countries are given a rating between A - E and a score between 1 - 100, with E and 100 representing 
the highest risk.  · 
(3)  The higher the score in the ranking. the lower ltle creditworthiness of the country 
(4)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of defautt A given country 
· may improve _its  rating and still fall in the ranking if also  the average global rating for aU rated countries imp"roves.  -.-,  ,  -
Last update: 
28102194 
Real GOP growth rate (in%)  .  •. 
Industrial-production (%change)  _ 
Unem~yment  rate (erld of penod) 
lnflation.rate  . 
Exchange rate (-'lei per U$D) · 
Nominal effectiVe exchange rate.· 
Real effective exc~nge  rate 
Cour1try Risk indi':ators 
Country: ·  Romania 
',I • 
_  (Dec/Dec) 
(chimge,  Dec/Dec)  .. 
(chtinge,  04104)  (- =  d~P,.ecistion) 
(cl'lsnge,  04104)  (- =  depreciation) 
General government balance (as -t. of GO.P.) 
·I  -·  ·1991 
l·. 
-1s., I  -
-Hlsi 
6 1: 
I 
I  222 8 i. 
I  433 l:  I 
I 
-72.9 I 
i 
-17 1 i 
I.  i 
i  ! 
L  0 6 i 
1992  -I  ,~3  (1) 
-15.4 
. -22,.1 
8.4 
.1985 
1_341 
-74.6 
- -24 0 
-5.5 
'1.0 
' 7.7. 
9.9 
'294.7 
214 1 
-56.9 
65.7 
- -2 9  . ! 
t-----'-----~-------''-------'---~---"-----'--"---7--'---------:--"---~_:__  _  _J!lc,·_~-~ 
' Balance of payments 
Exp0~  of <3&s  (in m•o USD)'  , 
· Currerit account balance (1n % of GDP) 
Net' inflOw of' foretgn direct Investment (in mio uso  )_ ..  -
Official FX'reser-Ves (end of penod) 
:;n  _m1o  US{)  .. 
in months- of  __ imports of G&S 
. External debt 
EXternal debt 
(m converttble currencte~. m bn USD. -end of  peno.d) 
medium and'tongcterm (>.1  yeilr)  / 
short~term.(=< 1 year)  · 
Convertible debt ser¥tce (in mio USD) 
-principal  ·  -
interest·' 
·  ~xtem;al debtJGDP (%). 
EXternal debt/exports of G&S (%)-
.Debt service/exports o(G&S (•.o~.j 
ArTEiars'{'on botti interest'and pnnc1pal.  in m•o U.SD) 
beet relief agreements and rescheduling -
f 
!  3538 i 
-l i  3 
37: 
198 
05 
2  1 
l  1 
10:. 
90 
13 i' 
n; 
16' 
59 6 
2 5 i 
t:Jo• 
No 
I 
.  42'861 
_, 61 
73 1 
.·  I 
93 r 
o·2j 
' 
-; 
4  1 
- I 
291 
121 
-444 
3001  144  -
2i·o 
95.1 i 
10.4 i 
Noi 
No: 
4500 
-10.6 
50 
_52 
'0 1 
5:8 
4.6 
,  2 
750 
500 
250 
21.8 
129.6 
167 
No 
No 
-----.-'------C---.-,--.----~-'  ---------~~---i-~--..:.J 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no . 
(Date I:) 
On  trackloff trac'loi 
(-/Date) 
SBA 
(4/91-4/92) 
On track 
SBA  -_No 
(05192 -03193) ; -
· Off track-
Dec 92 
1--~--,---------'--------:___  _______  -'---c_ ______________  __, ____  -i---~-----J 
Indicators  -~f mar-kers perc~ived  ~reditworthine_ss -
Moo<;iy's lOng-term foreign currency  .rating (end·  of period) 
S&P long-term fore•gn currency rabng (end of 'penoo) 
EIU country risk service (2)_ 
Score (end o(~riod) 
Rabng (end oif)eriod) 
-Euromoney  . 
· ·  POs'rtion. in -the ran k•rig '(3-) 
:(nuri:tbefof C:ountries) 
The lnstitutionallnvestor  ·__  . 
PoSition in'the rankin'g (3) 
{nt:imber of countries)  -
•Credit rating (4) 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Not raieo 
. n a.  60  65·-
!  na  !.  D  0  · 
I  Mar. _Sep 
I  .89  12  .·  .74  75 
I  (13oJ  (169)  .  (169) (170J 
I 
~ar Sep  Mar  ?ep  Mar  s·ep 
60  64  .  69  68·  73  75 
(  i,  1) ( 113) (, 19) { 1  26)  ( 127) (t  3:3> 
!  27 9  26 7 125 6  24.8  24 2  24.4 
I  : 
(f)  Forsorne·data. preitmihary E!Stimab~s.  .  .  . 
(2) :countries are .given a rating between A - E an'd a score between 1 ~ , 00. with E  and , 00 representing 
the highest risk  ·  ,  •  _  ·  .  ·  ·  ' 
·(3}  The-ihigher.the sCore in the ranking, the lower.the cred_itworthiness of the country  -
•(4)  Countries~are-rated on a scale--of zer  __ o·to ·100, with 100  representing the_ least chance of default A given country 
•may improve its rating and still 'fall in tt1e  ran~lng if alSo the average global rating for all rated countries improves. 
~".:---. U-F-3 
Last update: 
"01103194  . 
Real GDPgrOYAh rate (in%)· 
Industrial production (%change) 
Country Risk indicators 
Country:  Russia · 
! 
I. 
U~mployment  rate (end. of period- ILO definition) 
· Inflation rate 
· Exchange rate ( Rbs per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
.. Real effective exchange rate 
(Dec/Dec)  I 
· (c_hange,  Oecl[)ec)  - I 
'(change. 04104}  (~ =  depreciation) 
.  (change, 04104}  (-'= depreciaiJon} 
Ge~eral  government balance (as % of GDPf 
..  ·-----
1991  .,  .  1992  ' 
I 
' 
'  ! 
-12 9'  -190j 
·~oi·  -1801 
n.a.~ .  ri.aj 
i 
:  !· 
1601  .- 2500! 
· n  al  . .  1451' 
-63.61 (04/.  01) -55.6 
-25.3  (04/0  1  l  90.o I 
I  j 
'  ' 
··  -16 5i  -20 o! 
199~  (1) 
-12.0 
-J6.2 
5.1 
840 
·201 
~2.5 
268.4 
-10.0 
r-~'------'-----'----'--------'---,---'- ·------+---------~·  ...  -----~-------'-"'" 
~lance  of P:'lyments 
Exports ofG&S (in bn USD)  . 
Current account balance {1n  % of GOP)  . 
Net inflow of fore.gn d1rect investment (in bn _USD) 
Official FX reserves (end of period)  _ , 
·in mio USO 
in months of imports of G& S 
0.0 
0 0  . 
1------------'-------~  -~--'------'----'----· ----·  ________  ,  __  .. 
External debt 
· · External debt 
(in convertible currencies. m bn USD. end otpenod) 
medium and long-term (>  t  year) 
short-term (=< 1 year) 
Convertible debt service (m bri USD) 
principal 
interest 
_  External debtiGDP. (%} 
.- External debt/exports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears {on both interest, and princ1pal. in bn USD} 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling. 
IMF arrangemenis 
.Typelno· 
(Date/-) 
On track/off track. 
(-/Date)  _ 
67 o: 
.54  3 
12 7 
n a· 
'  n  a' 
;  n a.i· 
I  n a·.l 
' 
i  131.0; 
n a' 
'  4.8i 
!  Noi 
" 
; 
r 
! 
' 
~ 
41;  '43 
-1  6: (Jan-Sep) 6.3 
0 7:  _- 1~1 
2.1: 
0 7: 
45 
2.3 
.  ·:-_______  _:  ___ _ 
777  (03)  82.0 
64·7  - 720 
130  ..  10 0  . 
15.8.  ...  20 0 
iOAi  .  14.0 
5.4!  .  6.0 
9B.oi  .  59.0 
. ·190.0:.  .  190.0 
38 o:  ..  46.0 
14 9!  n.a 
.Pans Club  I  Paris ~lub 
(deferra!s)  (resched.) 
London Club  London Club-
1st cred1l 
.trancne 
Aug 92 
STf 
Jul93 
~---
1-------------'----·-------------·  --·----------~  ----------------1  -. 
Indicators of market's perceived creditworthiness·  '  i  '  i.  i 
Moc;>d:{s long-term foreign currency rating (end of period)  i 
!:-Jot  r~led  Not rated  ~Not r;ited 
S&P long-term foreign-currency rating {end of period)  I  Not rated  Not rated·  ·Not rated 
EtU country risk service (2)  - i 
'  _Score (end of  period} · 
I 
95  95  ..  I  . 
n.a. 
Rating (end of. period)  na  E  E 
- ··  Euromoney 
I 
Mar  Sep 
..  Position in the ranking (3}  I  n.a  129 
I 
'1.49  1-37 < 
(number of countries}  I  (130}  (169)  (169} (170} 
The Institutional Investor 
I 
M~r Sep  Mar· Sep  Mar· _Sep 
Position in the r11nking (3)  - I  - 73  87  92 
(number of countries)  i  - i 
- (126)- i'  (l27) (133) 
Cr_edit rating (4)  I 
- ·- 23.6  !  20.2  19.0 
I  i  I 
(1)  For some data, preliminary estimates.  .  . 
(2)  Countries are given a rating. between.A- E' and a score ~tween  1 - 100, with E and 100 representing . 
the highest risk.  ·  ·  ·  · 
(3)  The hig~  the score in the ranking, the lower. the creditworthiness' of the country. 
(4} .  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with·1 00 representing the least chance of default  A given country  . 
may impiave its rating and still fall in  th~ ranking if also the average global rating for all rated cciunt'ries impro.ves. _ !'  ..  _....:.. 
11-F-3  Country Risk Indicators 
<  Last update:  Country: Fonner ~FR 
25/02/94 
1991  1992 
R~l  GOP growth rate {in%)  . '  -15,9  -7,0 . 
Industrial prOduction {% change)  ' 
-21,2  -12,0 
Unemploytl!erii rate (end of:period)_ :  6,6  5,0 
lnflation rate  ·"  (Dec/Dec) 
'.  52,0_  •  12,7 
Excluinge rate (korunys_ per USD)  (change, Dec/Dec) ·  ·..{),6·  3,8 
Nominal effective' exchange ril.te  (change, Q4/Q4)  <~ = deprec.iation)'  -12,4 
, .. 
1,0  -
Real effective exchange rate- (chan~e. Q4/Q4)  (~=depreciation}  -31,4  9,4 
General'eovemrnent baJance (as 0/e Of GDP)  -2,0  -4,3 
Bruan5e of_ payments.  '  ·. 
' 
Exports ofG&S {in mio USD)  12 595,0  14070,0 
Cum:tit account balanee (in% ofGDP) - .3,0  -
0,8 
Net  inflow of  foreign direct investment (iri mio USD)  '  594,0  1055,0  / 
Official FX reserves (erid of  period)  -- ·-
I  .. 
inbn uso  ..  ..  3,2  .  1,3 
in months of  imports ofG&S  1,3  1,1  . 
External debt  -- ·- - -· 
External debt  9 793,0  .  9484;0 
(in convertible currencies, in ;roo USD, end of  period) 
5 845,o 
·.  ·  medium and Iong~tCnn (> t·yeai) · ,. ·  ·  7 258,0 
short~  (,;, < 1 year)  -- · 
) 
2 635,0  -2 226,0 
~itvertible debt service(~ mio lJSD)  1778,0  1984,0 
principal  ·  _,  184,0  1294,0' 
interest  594,0- 690,0 
External debt/GOP(%)  28,2  _28,5 
External debt/exports ofG&S (%)  -.  - 82,0  62.1 
-Debt serviceleiqlorts ofG&S (%)  14,1  14,1 
Arrears (on both intereSt and principal, in mio USD)  4,0.  No 
Debt relief  a~ents  and rescheduling  .  ·'  No  No 
/ 
lMF arrangements 
' 
--
SBA  .SBA  Type/no_  - . -
(Dater-) .  (lf91-jf92)  -(4192;4193) 
· On track/off  track  - -On track  . On track· but 
(-/(~ate): 
'. 
expired with  . -
-- dissolution 
- ofCSFR 
Indicators of  market's pen:elved creditworthinesS 
,. 
!  --
Moody'~  lo~g-l~  foreign currency rating (end of  j>Ciiod)  rial - Bat 
. S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of  period)  ·-No rated  No raied . 
'Euromoney_  · ·  ·  -
Po5ition in the ranking (I)  - 35  CR49 SR 58 
(number of  countries)- (130)  .- (169)  -
-The Institutional InveStor·  Mar./Sep  Mar/Sep 
Position in the ranking ( 1)  - 32  34 .  37  39 
(number of  countries)  --
._, 
(11IXII3)  (l'l9) (126)  .. 
·  Credit'rating (2)  ·  -.  . 50.3  48,3  47,1  46,1 
,  __ 
(I)-·  The higher the S:COre in the rankmg, th~ lower the creditwortruness ofihe country.  _  .  -"  . 
(2)  .Countries are rated on a scale of  zero to 100, with 100 representing the ieast change of  default A  given country may improve itS rating and still fall in the 
ranking ihlso'the average global rating for  all rates countries improves.  - .  -
.  \  : 11-F-3 
Last update: 
28102194 
Real GOP growth rate (in%) 
Country Risk indicators 
Country:  Slovak Republic · 
lndust~l production ( % change)  . 
Unemployment  (%of labour force) (end of period); 
Inflation rate 
Exchange rate (SK's per USD) 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
General government balance (as  ~/. of GOP) 
Balance C?f payments 
Exports of G&S (1n  m1o USD) 
Current account balance (1n % of GOP) 
(Dec/Dec} 
(change. Dec/Dec) 
(change, 04104}  (- = depreciation) 
(change. 04104)  (- =  depreciation) 
Net'  inflow of foreign·direct investment (in m1o USD) 
Official FX rese(Ves (end of period) 
in  bn USD 
in months of imports of G&S 
I 
i 
I 
I 
1992 
I 
.  -601 
-12.8 
10.41 
. 12.71 
3.8 
1.0 . 
9.4 
-14.01 
I 
I 
I 
,7617 i 
0 2! 
1001 
; 
04: 
0.4i 
' 
1993 (1) 
. 
-9.0 
-8.6 
14.4 
25.1 
12.7 
-4.9 
16.7 
-7.0 
6683 
-24 
100 
0.4 
04 
·--------------------------------·--------------------- .. ----------~ 
External debt 
External debt 
(in converl1ble currencies. m bn USD. end of  penod) 
medium and long-term(> 1 year) 
short-term ( =  < 1 year) 
Convertible debt serv1ce  (1n  m1o USD) 
principal 
interest 
External debUGDP (%) 
External debUexports of G&S (%) 
Debt service/exports of G&S (%) 
Arrears (on both 1nterest and principai, in mio USD) 
Debt relief agreements and rescheduling 
'  2.6: 
2,: 
0.4• 
675; 
415' 
260i 
25.71 
33.61  . I 
8.91 
No! 
Not 
2.8 
24 
04 
670 
4So 
220 
28.1 
41.9 
10.0 
No 
No 
----------------1 
IMF arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date/-) 
On track/off track 
(-I Date) 
SBA 
(4/92-4193) 
STF  ·. 
:  (7193- ) 
on'  track but·:  On-track 
explfed w1th 
01ssolut1on 
1------------,-----------------------·--·  ··---o_f_C_S_F_R  _______  _ 
l!"dicators of market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's long-term fore1gn currency rating (end of penod) (2) 
S&P long-term foreign currency rating (end of period) 
EIU country risk service (3) 
Score (end of period) 
Rating (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the ranking (4) 
(number of countries) 
The InStitutional Investor (2) 
Position in the ranking (  4) 
(number of countries) 
Credit rating (5) 
(1)  For some data. preliminary estimates. 
(2)  For 1992. rating or pasition in the ranking assigned to the former CSFR. 
Ba1  I  Not rated 
Not rated  ·J  Not rated  ! 
;  Not rated 
Not rated 
i  58 
I 
(169) 
Mar,- Sep 
I 
37  3g 
(1 19)(125) 
;  471  46.1 
Not rated 
Not rated 
Mar- Sep 
56  63 
(169) (170) 
Mar- Sep 
57  57 
(127) (1,33) 
31  30.6 
(3)  Countries are given a rating between A- E and a score between 1 - 100, withE and 100 representing 
the highest risk. 
(4)  The higher the score in the ranking, the lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
· (5)  Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the least chance of defau~.·  A given country 
may improve its rating and still fall in the ranking if also the average global rating for all rated countries improves. .  .  ..  ..  .  TABLE 1 · 
CAPITAL OUTSTANDING IN  RESPECT OF OPERATIONS DISBURSED 
.  · Aljthorized ceiling  ·  Capital  Capital 
Operations  outstanding  ·outstanding 
30.06.93.  31.12.93. 
.. 
MEMBER STATES·  .. 
A. Balance of payments  14000  - .. 
1. Greece 1- . 1750  200  200 
2.  Greece II  2200 
) 
1000  1000  ·' 
3.  ltalie  8000  - 1979  3990 
B. Others 
.4. Euratom  4000  1144  •1018 
5. NIC and  NIC.earthquake~  6830  2813  2202 
6.  EIB  Mediterranean.  ..  ,  -· 
Spain,Greece, Port.  1500  629  572 
MEMBER  STATE:;> TOTAL  26330  7764  8982 
THIRD COUNTRIES 
.  A.Fina~cial assistanCe  · · 
1. Hungar}'  1050  790  790 
2. Czechoslovakia  . 375  375  375 
3. Bulgaria  400  - 290  290 
4.  Romania  455  455  455 
5. Algeria  400  250  250 
6.  Israel  160  .,  160  160 
7.  Baltic States  220  60  110 
8.  FoiTT!er Soviet Union  1250  - 616  803 
'  B.Others  ' 
9.  EIB  Med  6167  1532  1596 
10. EIB Central and EaStern Europe I  1700  191  300 
11.  EIB Central and Eastern Europe I  3000 
. 12.· EIB Asia;Latin·Ameriea  .·  ·  750 
12. Guarantees CIS  500  363  '  266 
THIRD COUNTRIES -TOTAL  16427  5082  ..  5395 
' 
GRAN[;) TOTAL  42757  12846  . 143n. 
-
1) No disbursement 1s plannea. 
2) The third and fourth tranches could be paid on 1 February 1994 and 1995. So far, 
the .Italian Government ha~  not requested payment.  · 
ANNEX'TO  TABLE 1 
•  SITUATION IN RESPECT OF EIBOPERATIONS 
..  - Credit~line  Loans·made  Initial  . 
·operations  authorized  available, minus  disburSement 
cancellations . 
EIB Med.  : 
Spain,  Greed~. Portugal  - 1500.  1465  1620 
Third countries EIB Med.  ..  6167  .. ·3573  2266 
. Central and Eastern  E~rope I  . 1700  1650  300 
central and Eastern Europe 11  3ooo·  5  0 
Asia; Latin America  750  99  0 
-
NB: The fa~  the initial disbursement sam~times  exceeds the authorized ceiling is due· 
to  d~renees  in th_!i! ecu rate between the date on whic~  contracts were signed and 
31  December 1993.  ·  .  .  .  .  ·  - .. 
Remainder to 
be disbursed 
. 31.12.93 
0 
'  '12001  ) 
2)  ·.  4000 
0 
0 
0 
5200 
260 
0 
110 
0. 
150 
0  -. 
110 
447 
3901 
1400 
3000 
750 
-·- 0 
10128 
15328 
·Amount 
outStanding 
at 3Ll2.93 
•'• 
572 
1596 
.-300 
0 
0 MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A.Satance of pavments 
1. Greece 
2.1talv  / 
B.Struc:turalloans 
3. Eurarom 
4. NCI et NCI EQ 
5. EIB Med.Oid. Prot. 
.  ~G- .  '_) 
TABLE 2 
MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET · 
(Estirrate in ECU miliOn based on all ODeralions disbursed at 31  December 1993) 
1993 
569 
358 
1177 
1994 
200 
265 
663 
1995 
46 
484 
1996.  . 1997 
500 
500 
152 
330 
434 
533 
1998 
500 
992 
92 
95 
1999 
16 
40 
2000  TOTAL 
11:59 
2498  3990 
12  1376 
40  3363 
~~Sp~,G~re~·~P~o~rt  ______________  ~--~54~----~9~1~----~84=4-----77~+---~7~6~  ____  58~~---~5~1~----~~~- 5~~ 
Capital· subtotal 
INTEREST 
A.Satarce of oavmeniS · 
1. Greece 
2.1talv 
B.Struc:tu.ralloans ' 
2158  1220 
147  110 
252 
615 
95 
252 
1559 
95 
252 
3. Eurarom  112  81  61  57 
4. NCietNCIEQ  298  188  132  93 
1044 
46 
213 
44 
65 
1737 
46 
213 
10 
17 
107 
157 
3 
B 
2596 
157 
1 
5 
11035 
539 
1496 
369' 
804 
5. EIB  Med.Ok:l Prot.  · 
~~S~p~,G~r~e,~P~o~rt----~--------~---~3.~1+---~50~~~---·~4~24---~3~5~+----~2~74-----~21~----~1~Bc~----~1~14-~~2~3~3-~ 
Interest -subto1al. 
MEMBER STATES TOTAL 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
CAPITAL 
A.Financial assis1arice 
6. HunQarv 
7. Czechoslovakia 
B.  Bul~aria 
9. Romania 
1o.  Al~eria 
11. 1srae1 
12. ex-USSR  • 
13. Baltic States 
B.Guarantees 
14. ElB Med, 
15. BB C+ E Eur.1 
16. Aid Russia 500 
Interest -subtotal 
INTERETS 
A.Financial assistance 
6.  Hur~Qarv · 
7. Czecoslovakia 
8. Bu!Qaria 
9. Romania 
10.A!Qeria 
11.1srael 
12. ex-USSR 
13.·BalticS~ 
B.Guarantees 
14. EIB Med: 
15. EIB C+E Eur. I 
16. Aid Ro.issiA 500 
Interest· subtotal 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES -TOTAL 
588 
56 
103 
159 
81 
38 
29 
42' 
25 
16 
30 
3 
61 
8 
34 
367 
5261 
681 
1901 
112 
130 
2 
133 
377 
79 
38 
29 
46 
25  i 
16 
60 
11 
120 
21 
24 
488 
866 .· 
582  532 
1197  2091 
350  260 
511  ,179 
139  137 
13  22 
133 
1145 
79 
38 
29 
46 
25 
16 
69 
'11 
109 
21 
9 
452 
1597 
598 
.44 
·38 
29 
46 
25 
16 
18 
11 
99 
20 
345 
943 
395 
1439 
80 
190 
140 
250 
160 
140 
26 
987 
' 
. 307 
2044 
100 
185 
150 
185 
144 
29 
794 
18  10 
38  19 
29  15 
46  46 
25 
16 
11  •,  11 
88  78 
18  16 
289  195 
1276  988 
184 
291 
190 
140 
28 
358 
27 
11 
67 
14 
119 
477 
174 
-----+----1 
2771 
80 
110 
129 
26 
345 
8 
I 
11  ,  .. 
57 
12 
88 
433 
14476 
790 
375 
290 
455 
250 
160 
802 
110 
1015 
146 
369' 
4763 
311  I 
209 
160 
307 
125 
- 80 
197 
80 
6791 
,29 . 
67 I 
23441 
71071 
GRAND'TOTAL  3270 I  27661  2794  3033  2715  3032  788  3204  21582 
(Eastern Europe)  I  36j  575  1308  666  5~- ---76-7. ~7;  e- --~47~--4-7-97-
(0iher non-membe~  co~ntries) ___  ·_L_ ~.:!  __  :  ---290---'-----2-B9--'----2~7c..6_.._  ____  s_so__L ____  22~  --~ --~6c ~J ;"  -·, 
\:.:·V 
TABLE3 
MAXIMUM THEOREllCAL ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET 
(Estimate in ECU million based on all operations disbursed adopted and proposed by the Commissionion · 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  TOTAL 
MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A. Balance of payments 
1. Greece  569  200  500  500  600  600  2969 
2. Italy  .  500  1000  4498  5998 
B.Structuralloa~o:; 
3. Euratom + NCI  1535  929  531  482  967  187  56  53  4739 
4. EIB So.Gr Port  54  91  84  77  76 
I  58  51  46  537 
Capita~  subt~l  .  2158  1220  615  .1559  1044  . 1745  707  5196  14243 
INTEREST  .. 
A.Balanceofpaymeilts 
1. Greece  147  170  215  215  166  166  120  ·60  1259 
2.  Italy  425  .  595  680  638  . 638  553  553  4081 
B.Structuralloans  - 3.  Euratom + NCI  408  270  193  149  .1o9  27  '  10  6  1172 
4.  EIB So.Gr Port '  31  50  42  35  2'r  21  16  11  233 
lnterets-subtotal  566  915  1045  1079  940  851  698  630  6744 
MEMBER STATES- TOTAL  2744  2134  1660  2638  1983  2596  1406·  5827  20988 
.. 
' 
NON- MEMBER COUNTRIES 
CAPITAL. 
A.Fiminciill assistance 
5.  Hungary  3So  260  80  100  260  1050 
6:  Czechoslovakia  190  185  375 
7.  Bulgaria  140  150  55  345 
8.  Romania  185  1s0  80  455 
9.  Israel 
I  .160  \  160 
10. Algeria  ..  250  150  400 
11. Ex-USSR  191  653  406  1250 
12. Baltic States  110  110· 
13. Euratom, C+E Eur.  r  10  23  33  .. 
B.Guarantees  ' 
14. EIB Med  ..  56  130  139  137  180  245  324  379  1590 
15. EIB C+E Eur.l +II  2  13  22  70  139  227  301  774 
16. EIB,Asia,latin America  4  12  27  39  82 
17 .Aid ~ussia auar.500m ·  103  133  133  369 
-. 
lnterset- subtotal  ..  159  456  1288  825  1074.  1016  1038  .1137  6993 
INTEREST 
A.Financial assistance  · 
5.  Hungary  81  92  -105  70  44  36  26  454 
6.  Czechoslovakia  38  38  38  38  38  19  209 
7.  Bulgaria  29  35  4o  40  40  26  11  11  232 
8.  Romania·  42  46  46  46  46  46  27  8  307 
9.  Israel  16  16  16  16  16  '  eo 
10. Algeria  25  40  40  40  40  15  15  15  230 
11. Ex-USSR  30  102  106  41  279 
12.  Baftic States  3  17  22  22  22  22  22  22  152 
13:Euratom, C+E Eur.  8  25  45  65  85  102  107  437 
B.Guarantees 
14. EIBMed.  61  143  193  270  345  394  414  392  . 2212 
15.EIB C+ E Eur.l et II  8  47  113  204  298  367  400  390  1827 
16. EIB; Asia, latin America  2  10  23  39  53  62  62  251 
17.Aid Russia auar.500m  34  24  9  67 
In-terest- subtotal  367  610  763  855  993  1063  1079  1007  6736 
NO~EMBER  COUNTRIES-TOTA  526  1066  2051  1680  2067  2079  2117  2144  13729 
GRAND TOTAL  3270  3200  3711  4317  4050  4675  3523  7971  34717 
.. 
(E-astern Europe>·  368  735  1653  1194  1033  1360  1275  1107  8724 
(Other non-member countries )  158  331  398  4_86  1034  719  842  1037  5005 EXPLANATORY NOTES 
The purpose of these tables is to show the annual repayments of capital and interest in 
respect  of borrowing  and  lending .  o~rations for  which  the  risk  is  covered  by  the 
Community budget.  The figures  show the maximum possible risk for the Community 
in respect of these operations and  must not be read aS  meaning that these amounts will 
actually be drawn from the budget.  In the case of Table 3, it is not certain that all the 
operations described will actually be disbursed.  No account has been taken of interest 
on late payment or any additional costs s_uch as lawyers' fees. 
I~  TYPES  OF  OPERATION  . AND  PAYMENT  OF  THE  BUDGET 
GUARANTEE 
A.  Types of operation 
The risk covered by the Community budget results from two types of  operation: 
- borrowing/lending operations; 
-.  guarantees given to third parties. 
In the  first  type of operation,  the Com!Jlunity  borrows on  the  financial  market 
and on-lends the proceeds· (at the same rate and  for the same term)  to Member 
States  (balance  of payments),· non-member  countries  (medium-term  fmancial 
assistance) or firms (NCI, Euratom). 
The loan.  repayments are scheduled  to  match  the repayments of the borrowings 
due from  the Community.  If  the recipient of the loan defaults,  the Commission 
must draw on its budgetary resources to repay the borrowing on the due date. 
The loan guarantee is in· respect of loans granted by a financial institution (EIB or 
commercial banks in the case of the former Soviet Union).  When the recipient of 
a guaranteed  loan  fails .to  make  a payment on  the due  date,  the  bank asks  the 
Commission to pay the amounts owed by the defaulter. 
B.  . Mobilization of funds 
The funds needed to pay the budget guarantee can be raised in three ways: 
The re-use of amounts repaid by debtors who have defaulted, leading to 
activation  of the  Community  guarantee,  allows  payments  to  be made 
within a short period of time always providing, of course, that there are 
funds available. 
- The transfer procedure can  be used  to  provide the budget heading with 
the  appropriations  needed  to  cover  the  default.  This  method  is  used 
when  there  are  insufficient  appropriations  for  re-use  and  must  be 
authorized in advance by the budgetary authority. - 'J:'he amount required may be taken provisionally from cash resources in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Financjal Regulation.  This method is 
used, in particular, when the Community has so short a  deadline for the 
payment  of a  guarantee  that  the  budgetary  authority  has  no  time. to 
approve a transfer.  · 
'. 
This  operation  .-is  subsequently  regularized  by  means  of  a  transfer  or  a 
supplementary and/or;amending ~udget. 
D.  CALCULATION. 
A. 
1. 
2. 
· · Some of the amounts i~dicated are the. result· of estimates made on the baSis of  the 
following assumptions.  ·  · 
Generally speaking, the exchange rates for loans in currencies other than the ecu 
are assumed to have been stable since 31  December 1993.  However, borrowing 
and lending operations  should  not involve exchange risks  for  the  Community.  _ 
Unless otherwise stated,  the  average rate of interest is estimated at 10%.  This  . 
rate 'is probabiy a little high for EIB loans, which often attract i.nterest ·subsidies 
under the protocols.  · 
.Member States 
·Greece:  The existing BOP loan· to Greece has run its course and there will be no 
.further disbursements.  There ·are no plans for any new loans . 
.Itah:  The Council  d~ision of 18 January 1993  granted  a  ECU 8 000  million 
· balance-of-payments  loan  to  Italy.  The loan  is  to  be  made  available  in  four.· 
instalments amounting to ECU 2 000 million each and - with the exception of the 
first  instalment  - is  conditional  on  the attainment  of agreed. targets  on  Italy's 
public debt and deficit. ·  ·  · 
The first two instalments were released in _1993.  Concerning  th~ coming period, 
the  Council  Decision  states  that  the_  third  instalment  could  be released  as ·  of 
1. February 1994  (but the Italian  Govern~ent has  not yet  applied  for  it).  · The 
fourth instalment may be released npt earlier than 1 February 1995. 
If  the Italian Governmenf decides to apply· for the release of  the third and fourth 
instalments and the conditions are deemed to be fulfilled  ECU 2 000 million  in 
· _  1994 and ECU 2 000 million in-1995 will be disbursed to the Italian Republic  .. 
3.  EIB.  Mediterranean.  old  protocols:  Spain.  Greece.  Portugal:  These  are 
· Community guarantees for EIB  operations in  these countries prior to accession. 
The amounts are nowfirial, since all the loans authorized have been disbursed. 
/,, 
&,c B.  Non-member countries  ' 
a.  Financial assistance 
1.  Hungary I: The amounts of the·.fitst two tranches are final and certain.  The third 
tranche of the _macrofinancial  assistance decided  in  1990 is not  expected  to  be 
disbursed in  1994 or 1995  .·  ' 
2.  Hungary II:  ECU 180 million has been granted and paid out in full. 
3.  Czechoslovakia:.  ECU 375 million  has  been  granted  in  two  tranches  for  a 
maximum term of seven years (bullet),  with a first tranche of ECU 185  million 
and a second-tranche of ECU 190 million for a term of six years, 
.  . 
4.  Bulgaria I:  ECU 290 million  has  been granted in two tranches for a  maximum 
term of seven  years (bullet),  with a first tranche of ECU 150 million  for a  term 
of seven years and a second tranche of ECU 140 million for a term of five years. 
s.·  Bulgaria II: The financial  ~ssistance of ECU 110 million decided in  1992 has not  · 
been disbursed since Bulgaria has failed to meet the necessary conditions. 
6.  Romania I:  An estimated ECU 375 million in two tranches for a maximum term 
of seven years (bullet).  The first tranche of ECU 190 million  was disbursed  in 
1992  with  a  term of seven  years and the second  was disbursed in  1992  with  a 
term of siX  years. 
7.  Romania II:  The new operation involving ECU 80 million  for a  maximum  term 
of seven years was disbursed in 1993.  · 
· 8.  Baltic States: The first tranche of a loan of ECU 220 million  was paid  in  1993. 
The second should be paid in  1994.  The two tranches will be repaid in 2000 and 
2001 respectively.  · 
9.  Algeria:  ECU 400 million has been granted in two tranches of ECU 250 million 
and ECU 150 million ..  The fir.st  was  paid  in  December 1991  for a  term  of six. 
y~s.  The second  tranche has  not been  disbursed  since  Algeria  has  failed  to 
meet the necessary conditions.  This tranche may be disbursed in  1994 as a result 
of Algeria's new economic programme.  ·  ·  · 
10.  Israel:  A  loan of ECU 160 million  has  been  paid. in  full  and  is  repayable  in 
1997 .. 
b'.  Guarantees 
1.  . EIB 
Figures provided by the EIB for loans disbursed at 31  De<_;ember  1993. 
For subsequent loans,  we have made the. following  assumptions concerning  the 
·signature of loans .(ECU million). Year. 
Mediterranean countries  · 
Central and. Eastern Europe
7 
Other non-member countries. 
1994 
890 
705 
150 
1995 
870 
965 
"250 
1996 
870 
1270 
.. 250 
TOTAL 
·2630. 
3000 
650. 
ln the case of  these loans and those already signed at the end of December 1993 
but not yet· disbursed. {ECU 1 307 million  for  the Mediterranean  countries and 
· ECU 1 350 million  for  the countries of Central  and  Eastern  Europe),· we  have 
· assumed  that an .average of 10%  of  the  loan  will  be disbursed  in  the year of 
signature and 30%  in each of the three following .years.  ·In  the case of the new 
operations  following  the  renewal  of EIB  loans  of ECU 3 000 million  in  the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe for a period of three years~ it is  assumed 
. that the signatures will take place as indicated in the financial statement drawn up 
by the Commission. 
It is estimated'that the.average term will be fifteen years with a thr~yeai  period 
of·grace~  ·  ·  · 
2.  Food aid for the former Soviet Union 
(a)  Guarantee 
Thi.s  is  a  guarantee  for  a  bank  loan  of ECU 500 million,  with  pri~cipal  and 
interest' fully coveted by the budget,  for a  term  of three and a  h~f years  with 
three repayments at intervals of eleven months starting from the twentieth month. 
ECU 375 million has been used. 
(b)  B~rrowing/lending 
An  operation involving ECU 1 250 million for a maX.imum  term of three years. · 
·.  .  '  .  '  .  .  .. 
This  borrowing  will· be" divided  between  the  various  Republics: of the  former 
Soviet Union.  Loans amounting to  less than ECU 100 million  will be repaid in 
one instalment three years after the start of the period in which. ~he funds may be 
dl}lwn.  Borrowings exceeding ECU 100 million will be repaid in two instalments 
two years and three years after the start of the period iri which ·the funds  may be 
drawn.  ·  · 
Depending on the type of contract, there are two periods in  which funds  may be 
drawn;· onestarts on 20 August, the other on 15 January.  · 
.  It is assumed that the balance of ECU 44 8 million still to be used at 31. December  . . 
1993 will be disbursed in  1994.  ·· 
3..  Euratom. countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
Of the ECU 1 100 million involved,  it is assumed  that ECU 150 million  will be 
.disbursed- in  1994,  ECU 200. million  in  each  of the  four  following  years  and 
. ECU 150 million in  1999.  . 
It is assumed that the loans will  be for an  average term of twenty. years with a 
five:'-year period of grace  .. 
Including renewa1  from 1993. 9 
ANNEX 
DEFINITION o·F FIG~  USED IN THE REPORT  .. 
A.  Authorized ceiling (fable 1) 
. This is the aggregate of the maximum amounts of capital authorized (ceilings) for 
each  operation  decided  or of the  amount  proposed  by  the  Commission  for 
operations for which there has not yet been a Council decision.  . 
In  order 'to relate it  to the risk which the budget might  have  to  cover,  account 
should be taken <?f the following factors which could affect it: 
- factor increasing the risk:  the interest on the loans must be added to the 
authorized ceiling; 
factors reducing the risk: 
limitation  of the  guarantee  given  to  the  EIB  to 75%  of the  loans 
signed in the Mediterranean countries; 
operations already repaid,  since the amounts concerned,  except in  the 
case· of balance of payments  supp(>rt,  are the  maximum  amount. of 
loans granted and not outstanding amounts authori~; 
the amounts authorized are not necessarily taken up in full. 
The breakdown of authorizations is as follows: 
Member States 
Balance of payments 
NCl 
Euratom 
EIB; Spain, Greece, Portugal 
Member States- total 
---------:----; 
14 000
8 
6 830 
4 000
9 
1 500 
26 330 . 
Authorized  amount  outstanding:  once  this  figure  is 
reached,  further  loans  may  be  granted  as  previous 
operations are repaid. 
Including  ECU  1  100 million  . which  may  be  granted  to 
the countries of Eastern Europe  and the CIS. :  ' 
B. 
I. 
Non-member countries 
Hungary I  870 
Hungary II.  180 
Czechoslovakia  375 
Bulgaria I  290 
Bulgaria II  110 
Romania I  375 
Romania II  80 
Israel  160 
· Algeria. ·  400 
former Soviet Union I  408 
former Soviet Union II  1 250 
Baltic States  220 
BIB, old protocols ·  3 032 
BIB~ Eastern Europe I  '1 700 
BIB, Eastern Europe II  2 750 
BIB, Baltic States  200 
BIB, Albania- 50 
BIB;  new-protocols  1 435  . 
BIB, horizontal cooperation  1 800 
Other non-member countries  750 
Non-member countries- total  16  185 
Grand total  42 515 
Canital outstanding (Table 1) 
•  This  is  the amount  of capital  still  to  be  repaid  on a given  date  in· respect  of 
operations disbursed.  ·  · 
'  .  .  .  .  . 
Compared with  the previous aggregate,,  the amount outstanding does not include 
loans  which  have not  yet been  disbursed  nor the proportion  of disbursed  loans 
.  which  have already been  repaid.  It may be described  as  the  amount of loans 
which exist on a given date.  , 
C.  Annual risk 
Estimated amount of principal and interest due each financial year. 
This amount is calculated for: 
disburs~ments alone  (Table 2),  in  which  case the capital  to  be repaid 
corresponds· to the amount outstanding; · 
- disbursements,  decisions  still  awaiting  disbursement  and  Commission 
proposals still awaiting deCisions  (Table 3),  in  which case the capital to 
be repaid  corresponds  to  the  ceiling ·~on  loans  authorized  plus,  where 
applicable,  the.  amounts  in  respect  of  operations  proposed  by  the 
Comr:nission and not yet deeided. 
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